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Abstract 
Maintaining preparedness for a disaster is a patient and provider safety issue that is often 
not a priority for hospital planning; however, the inability to implement and evaluate 
disaster/emergency preparedness programs may render hospitals and the overall 
healthcare system fragile and dysfunctional amidst such crises. Priorities such as 
emergency-department overcrowding and lack of funding emerge daily and contribute to 
the inability of hospitals to respond appropriately to unexpected events. This study was 
conducted with the aim to assess the correlation between disaster/emergency 
preparedness and related problems, policy, and politics. A cross-sectional survey design 
was used to determine whether problems, policy, and politics perceived by Tennessee 
acute-care hospital nurses predicted the disaster/emergency preparedness of their 
hospitals. A multiple linear regression model was applied to assess the effects of 
disaster/emergency problems, policy, and politics on disaster/emergency preparedness. A 
regression equation was created with respect to problems, policy, and politics predictor 
variables with age, gender, education, and location used as confounding variables. The 
results of the study revealed that policy (β = 0.41, p =.01) and politics (β = 0.26, p =.02) 
were related to disasters/emergencies, and these two significant variables can be used to 
predict disaster preparedness. In summary, disaster/emergency policy and politics predict 
preparedness within healthcare settings, including hospitals. These findings are 
suggestive of the urgent need for social change to require, develop, and implement a 
statewide hospital and overall standardized healthcare disaster/emergency-preparedness 
system with surveillance and monitoring for indicators of occurrence.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Overview 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), coupled with subsequent 
anthrax threats, underscored the inadequacy of U.S. emergency-response capabilities. In 
2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita further accentuated the substandard nature of domestic 
preparedness for effective emergency response across the nation. Such disasters and 
attacks are catalysts for a chain of reactive activities designed to enhance emergency- 
response capabilities (Duley, 2005). In 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(U.S. DHS; 2008) devised a national response framework to guide the development of a 
national all-hazards emergency-response system. An entire section outlined a response 
framework for public-health and medical services. However, a substantial functional gap 
exists between federal mandates and actual hospital preparedness (Cherry & Trainer, 
2008). 
The 2009 and 2010 influenza epidemics overwhelmed emergency departments 
(EDs) across the United States. Thousands of individuals sought treatment from an 
already overburdened system, demonstrating that the problem of surge capacity had yet 
to be resolved with an effective method of enhancing ED capabilities to manage the large 
influx of patients. With the added outbreaks of highly fatal viruses, such as Ebola, the 
paramount importance of EDs prepared for nearly any eventuality became clear. Hospital 
size, facility capabilities, and medical specialties vary considerably; however, several 
characteristics pose consistent themes. These include increased overcrowding, boarding 
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of admitted patients within the EDs, ED closures, and nursing-staff shortages (Kellerman, 
2006). 
Derlet, Richards, and Kravitz (2001) conducted a quantitative study inclusive of a 
comprehensive literature review. These researchers found no consensus as to a definition 
of ED overcrowding nor any specific numeric threshold to scientifically quantify such 
conditions. Research has indicated that overcrowding equates to a demand for emergency 
care exceeding the ability of emergency-response providers and ED resources (Derlet et 
al., 2001). The demand impedes the provision of care within a reasonable amount of time 
and forces caregivers to work within environments too pressured to provide quality care. 
These circumstances are reported daily by many EDs in the United States (Derlet et 
al.,2001). Consequently, effectively managing disasters may be beyond the existing 
capabilities of these pivotal emergency-care facilities. 
Background of the Study 
Prior to 1978, the U.S. Congress attempted to meet the need for national 
emergency preparedness primarily by applying fragmented strategies void of a unified 
structure or defined approach. Domestic preparedness hinged on ad hoc legislative action 
often motivated by policy designed to garner funding (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency [FEMA], 2010). The first disaster legislation on record was the Congressional 
Act of 1803 (as cited in FEMA, 2010), which allocated assistance to a New Hampshire 
town devastated by fire. Over subsequent years, several agencies were created or 
delegated the responsibility of administering disaster relief. These agencies ranged from 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, commissioned in 1932 following an earthquake, 
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to myriad civil-defense agencies including the Department of Agriculture. Most of these 
organizations served in a reactive capacity lacking a coordinated agenda. 
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (as cited in Bechtel, Betz, Deppe, Gels, & Haley, 
2004) required a presidential declaration and provided limited resources for disaster aid. 
However, as transportation, nuclear-regulation, and natural-hazard concerns increased, 
more than 100 agencies became involved at some level in disaster management, which 
complicated the management and oversight of responsibilities. In 1978, the FEMA was 
created to adhere to Executive Order 12148 with the objective of coordinating all 
disaster-relief efforts. The Agency was accountable for both disaster relief and civil 
defense. In 2003, the FEMA was absorbed by the U.S. DHS. Founded by President Bush 
in 2001, this department was designed by combining several federal agencies to 
coordinate multiple functions such as law enforcement, disaster preparedness and 
response, border control, and civil defense. 
Inclusion of Health Care 
The U.S. DHS, along with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(U.S. DHHS), supported hospital preparedness and the sequencing of disaster- 
preparedness funding (as cited in Bechtel et al., 2004). The Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) was the “arm” of the U.S. DHHS charged with 
providing resources to medically underserved populations. This organization was also 
responsible for advancing the preparedness of U.S. hospitals, particularly by enhancing 
their capacity to manage public-health emergencies including bioterrorism through the 
provision of guidance and financial resources. 
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In 2006, the management of funding for emergency preparedness was moved to 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Recovery, another agency 
within the U.S. DHHS. The management of emergency services and health funding 
remains under the auspice of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and 
Recovery while the HRSA now manages funding for fire and law-enforcement 
preparedness. A noteworthy change is that the funds formerly managed by the HRSA 
were earmarked for medical response and primarily directed toward hospitals, while 
funding under the authority of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and 
Recovery is allocated to a broader recipient base to supplement state and local initiatives 
supporting hospitals and health systems during public-health emergencies. Drawbacks are 
the increase in lack of funding, regardless of the growth in recipients, as well as the 
decrease in funding allocated to hospital preparedness (National Association of Public 
Hospitals and Health Systems, 2007). 
The economic condition of many hospitals has also dramatically declined, 
limiting their ability to support programs that do not generate revenue. This phenomenon 
has continued, even in light of recent policy shifts such as those introduced by 
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010). This Act 
created a new challenge for U.S. hospitals tasked with accommodating approximately 30 
million Americans becoming healthcare consumers who were formerly uninsured. 
Additionally, new health-coverage schemes compressed networks and limited higher cost 
healthcare providers, forcing many organizations to reduce their rates to remain 
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competitive. This shift in insurance strategy is forcing independent, free-standing 
hospitals and providers to consolidate; merge; or be acquired by larger, more competitive 
organizations. 
Many Americans rely upon their employers to supply healthcare benefits that 
cease when their employment ends. The employed are also impacted because economic 
crises force many employers to reduce healthcare benefits or structure plans with 
employee copayments that are costly and often unaffordable for workers. The result is yet 
another increase in underinsured individuals and newly insured patients seeking care in 
EDs. The billing for these high-cost services often goes unpaid. 
With the introduction of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
a greater number of Americans now have healthcare coverage in the form of Medicaid (as 
cited in the American College of Emergency Physicians [ACEP], 2014). However, this 
insurance covers less of the cost of services and, due to a shortage of primary-care 
providers, newly insured individuals continue to seek care in EDs. The result is increased 
service consumption coupled with low or absent compensation. This contributes to 
declining operating margins. When combined with the high cost of maintaining 
technology to support ever-increasing standards of care, the declining consumption of 
revenue-generating services, such as surgery, and the low reimbursement rates of 
Medicare and Medicaid, a significant financial shortfall characterizes the overall 
healthcare environment (Kiselev, 2010). 
The economic struggles of hospitals force tough strategic decisions related to the 
manner in which funds are allocated. Funding is channeled to programs with the greatest 
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return on investment and generation of revenue. Meanwhile, costly, and infrequently used 
programs, such as disaster preparedness, are relegated to a lesser position of need than 
revenue-generating operations. Therefore, disaster preparedness often receives solely the 
support needed to satisfy minimum regulatory standards. 
In January of 2001, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) added preparedness for chemical- and biological-agent exposure 
to the existing requirement for emergency preparedness (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). 
This was one of the first initiatives outlining and defining a specific standard of hospital 
emergency preparedness. In 2004, the Commission introduced standards for ED 
overcrowding that focused on enhancing patient throughput (JCAHO, 2004a). A 
preliminary set of standards for emergency-management planning was outlined, dictating 
that such planning must be adequate for effective response to multiple types of events 
with escalating, flexible capabilities for the management of infection control and disaster 
response (JCAHO, 2006b). As noted earlier, the U.S. DHS (2008) developed a national 
response framework to guide the development of a national all-hazards emergency-
response system. Each plan calls for conducting a hazard analysis and establishing 
structure for disaster/emergency care. 
Governmental Funding for Healthcare Preparedness 
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. DHHS budget allocated less than 2% toward healthcare 
preparedness, with a small fraction of this allocation directed to hospital personnel (as 
cited in De-Lorenzo, 2007). Following the anthrax attacks of 2001, funding for health 
preparedness began to improve with a grant of $135 million awarded February 15, 2001 
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for healthcare preparedness. Funding gradually increased, peaking at $515 million in 
2003 and 2004. However, in 2006, funding declined with only $350 million of a $3.8 
billion healthcare preparedness budget earmarked for public-health flu preparedness. 
Complicating this funding decline, a change in homeland-security philosophy emerged in 
2006, shifting the burden of healthcare preparedness to local communities and hospitals 
in the form of a national strategy for pandemic flu. With millions of patients contracting 
avian flu in 2009, only $362 million was budgeted for healthcare preparedness (Toner et 
al., 2009). 
Federal grant programs for disaster preparedness have been a positive asset in 
aiding hospital preparedness; however, such funding is a small proportion of the 
resources necessary to establish and maintain all-hazards preparedness. Toner et al. 
(2009) estimated the cost of preparing a 164-bed hospital for pandemic flu at $1 million, 
with an annual maintenance cost of $200,000. Flu preparedness is one small component 
of all-hazards preparedness. Preparing for natural disasters that bring large numbers of 
trauma patients to hospital facilities involves the inclusion of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear preparedness, in addition to knowledge surrounding improvised 
explosives, all of which introduce unique needs. Such needs require varied resources, 
specific training, and sophisticated facility capabilities such as decontamination, 
isolation, and personal protective equipment. The average related federal grant is between 
$5,000 and $10,000 per hospital facility, which is woefully inadequate to institute and 




Concurrent with the described preparedness issues, EDs encounter daily 
difficulties from operating beyond capacity. Consequences have included throughput 
obstructions from an inadequate number of available beds or staff to manage the volume 
of patients requiring admission. This has led to the boarding of admitted patients within 
the ED, which has, in turn, resulted in an inability to accommodate patients needing 
emergency care. This, in turn, introduces ambulance diversion to other facilities. ED 
patient loads have increased dramatically since 1992 with a 32% annual increase in ER 
visits (ACEP, 2009). Further compounding the problem, 7% of hospital EDs have closed 
(ACEP, 2009). 
ED overcrowding emerged during the 1980s. Incidence was initially isolated to 
hospitals located within urban areas (Derlet & Richards, 2000). To date, ED 
overcrowding has become a national problem due to the decreasing number of available 
inpatient beds as well as a changing pattern of ED use by the general public. With the 
financial need to improve efficiencies, inpatient beds have been reduced to correlate to 
average daily census. Therefore, Gallagher and Lynn (1990) attributed the decreasing 
number of inpatient beds to the shift in care provision to the outpatient setting and 
improved case management resulting in shorter lengths of stay. This elimination of 
unused beds and related resources has dramatically thwarted the ability of many hospitals 
to manage the influx of patients during disasters. 
Burt and McCaig (2001) found through quantitative study that patient acuity, as 
well as the complexity of their health conditions, have increased with longevity. Derlet 
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and Richards (2000) described a change in the pattern surrounding ED use. As noted 
earlier, the number of underinsured across the United States has served to increase the 
use of EDs as providers of primary care to avoid office visits with primary-care 
physicians requiring payment at the time of services. 
Hospital EDs are required to assess and treat, if needed, all patients presenting to 
their care facilities. This provision was included in the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1985, which was created to protect the rights of 
indigent patients pursuing emergency care. The legislation was a reaction to the practice 
of patient “dumping,” which is hospitals or hospital-based doctors refusing to treat 
uninsured patients with no other means of payment for care services. The EMTALA 
dictated that all Medicare-participating hospitals must provide a medical-screening exam 
and treatment to stabilize any emergency medical condition in all patients presenting to 
the ED (Moy, 2011). Until there is a system in place for universal health care, the ED will 
be the only milieu guaranteeing access to all patients for care. The EMTALA forces this 
scenario without encouraging consumers to be responsible for their health care. Due to 
the nature of the care provided by EDs, using these facilities for primary care creates 
adverse issues such as fragmented care from loss of the treatment-plan follow through 
that would routinely occur with a primary-care provider (ACEP, 2009). 
As noted earlier, no clear consensus exists as to a definition of ED overcrowding. 
However, Derlet et al. (2001) established a set of elements toward such definition. They 
included (a) all ED beds filled for more than 6 hours per day, (b) patients admitted to a 
hospital and boarded in the ED for more than 6 hours per day due to the unavailability of 
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inpatient beds, and (c) EDs unable to manage new arrivals and hence forced to close or 
divert ambulances to other facilities. The impact of these elements alone or in 
combination creates gridlock in a process that is designed for continuous throughput. 
The ACEP (2009) issued a national report card on the state of emergency 
medicine. The report was designed to address the realities of the ED, which includes its 
dual role as the provider of emergency care in crisis situations and as the safety net for 
individuals with no other point of access for medical care. It expanded upon the earlier 
version, drawing from data of the most up-to-date sources to assess five dimensions of 
ED care. Based upon 116 metrics, the following five dimensions were weighted to obtain 
a grade for each state and the District of Columbia, as well as the United States as a 
whole: (a) access to emergency care (30%), (b) quality and patient-safety environment 
(20%), (c) medical-liability environment (20%), (d) public health and injury prevention 
(15%), and (e) disaster preparedness. The overall grade for the nation was C–, with 
access to emergency care scoring a D–. The ACEP concluded that the needs of the 
growing and aging U.S. population far exceed the number of existing hospital EDs. The 
problem is exacerbated by the shortage of nurses and physicians, as well as the low 
number of primary-care and specialty providers. 
The report-card category of disaster preparedness is new to the ACEP (2009) 
reporting structure. It was added to capture the disaster-planning initiatives that are 
collectively becoming an integral facet of the emergency-care culture. The grade in this 
category was a C+. The ACEP task force collected state-specific data. This dimension 
targets the following four major areas essential to an effective medical response to a 
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disaster: (a) state coordination, (b) hospital capacity, (c) availability of trained staff, and 
(d) funding. 
The ACEP report confirmed the position that federal funding for disaster 
preparedness is inadequate (as cited in Cherry & Trainer, 2008). To compensate for this 
inadequacy, high-ranking states heavily invested state and local funds in systems and 
infrastructure that enable prompt and efficient response. Also noted by the ACEP, higher 
performing states receive high per capita federal funding for disaster response. The sites 
within these states have formal all-hazards medical-response protocols or Emergency 
Support Function #8 plans in place, which are coordinated with emergency medical 
services (EMS) and hospital personnel, among other enhancing factors. The ACEP 
perceived the U.S. grade of C+ as a reflection of the lack of critical funding to augment 
medical providers, as well as the lack of consistent direction by the federal government 
despite the efforts invested in disaster preparedness by many states. The College made 
eight recommendations for improving emergency care and called for emergency-care 
professionals, government officials, and private citizens to be made aware of its state-
specific report card and become active in supporting emergency-preparedness efforts. 
In summary, many of the factors revealed thus far allude to policy decisions that 
have negatively impacted the disaster-response capabilities of many hospitals. 
Consequently, future expectations must include a stronger focus on overall preparedness 
through the provision of enhanced training initiatives, planning for increased capacity, 
and improved allocation of available resources. ED capacity is recognized as a critical 
component of disaster/emergency response; however, within many hospitals, it is not 
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given the support and priority to enable development of the necessary response 
capabilities. Additionally, hospital preparedness, which is a key component of first 
response in disasters, is not given the support, priority, and guidance from federal 
agencies that is necessary to result in the allocation of funding and other resources 
(Cherry & Trainer, 2008). 
Problem Statement 
Many U.S. hospitals are challenged with limited resources, stressed capacities, 
and overcrowding on a daily basis. Federal expectations for hospitals are to have all- 
hazards preparation in place, enabling effective response to a variety of natural and man-
made disasters. Such response includes facilities, resources, and staff (Kellerman, 2006). 
Many hospitals lack adequate equipment, resources, and training to provide a safe and 
effective response to a mass casualty or hazardous-material exposure. This may 
negatively affect the victims of a disaster if staff members are unprepared or lack the 
resources to appropriately respond. However, the federal government has been providing 
various levels of funding and support to the hospitals and public-health departments of 
the country and, although great progress has been made in emergency preparedness, 
emphasis wans when other priorities dominate (Duley, 2005). 
The authorities and the management of U.S. healthcare centers are responsible for 
the performance of relief and disaster teams at the time of an emergency. However, if 
these authorities fail, for whatever reason, to prepare response teams properly and 
effectively for disasters, patient care suffers (National Association of Public Hospitals 
and Health Systems, 2008). Prompt and successful emergency services are therefore 
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reliant upon hospital authorities providing proper training and education to employees. 
The proper treatment of disaster victims is a pivotal facet of such training (Niska & 
Shimizu, 2011). 
Established disaster plans are critical to support response teams in their efforts to 
provide medical emergency support to victims. It is also essential for hospitals to be 
prepared for any emergency rescue operation that will require the availability of 
necessary medicine, medical equipment, and treatment facilities specific to the disaster 
response (Kellerman, 2006). Put simply, it is essential to reduce existing gaps between 
the expectations of the federal government regarding disaster preparedness and the actual 
preparedness of hospitals. This will contribute to improved EMS in times of disaster, 
thereby providing a higher level of medical treatment to victims and, in turn, contributing 
to rapid patient recovery and saved lives (Niska & Shimizu, 2011). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the current research was to examine the gap between effective 
hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare 
providers. Toward this end, statistics related to emergency-room preparedness have been 
analyzed, and the perceptions of nurse leaders regarding the state of readiness within their 
specific departments have been collected and examined. Federal expectations 
surrounding hospital preparedness were compared to related survey responses from first-
line ED caregivers. The findings of this study reflect the variance in the extent of 
preparedness between hospitals and emphasize the level of awareness among providers 
compared to preparedness expectations. 
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Events since 2001 have increased public awareness of the threat of disaster, man-
made or natural, and the need for a competent, adequate, and flexible emergency- 
response framework (Katz & Levi, 2008). The findings of this study expand the existing 
body of knowledge surrounding the gap between preparedness and related expectations. 
The current research may further provide an awareness of the current status of hospitals 
and holds the potential to alter the perceptions of stakeholders and stimulate further 
attention to the problem under study. The findings may provide greater understanding as 
to why interest in the development of policy related to hospital emergency preparedness 
has waned, as well as offer an avenue toward increasing needed attention (Kingdon, 
2011). 
To support the purpose of this study, I applied a quantitative research method with 
the intent to analyze various factors such as the availability of facilities and resources; 
preparedness policy, training, and education; and the perception of emergency-response 
capabilities within U.S. hospitals. I conducted a survey with a sample of ED nurse 
managers of Tennessee acute-care hospitals and correlated hypotheses to the research 
questions in order to gain a clearer understanding of whether the healthcare institutions of 
this particular region have met necessary standards for emergency preparedness. The 
survey consisted of 73 questions and was distributed to acute-care institutions with a 
dedicated ED within the state of Tennessee (see Appendix A). I analyzed the responses 
using statistical tools and techniques to arrive at reliable and valid conclusions. The 
principal objective was to understand how prepared participating hospitals were in 
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responding to certain emergencies that could realistically occur within the country such 
as natural disasters and terrorist attacks (Niska & Shimizu, 2011). 
It is essential for the hospitals of any country to prepare for all hazards and 
emergencies that could potentially occur from natural disasters or other incidents. Prompt 
response is required, and it is essential for hospitals to minimize loss of life. U.S. 
hospitals play a major role in the provision of such services to disaster-affected patients 
(Duley, 2005). Continuous preparation is therefore critical, along with maintaining all of 
the necessary facilities and resources that may be required for community support and 
relief work. Hospitals must provide proper training and education to employees and 
healthcare professionals so they can easily respond to unexpected situations while 
effectively continuing routine emergency operations. The government also plays a major 
role in the provision of sufficient funding and other support for these hospital initiatives, 
assuring the necessary resources (National Association of Public Hospitals and Health 
Systems, 2008). However, a gap exists between the expectations of the federal 
government regarding disaster preparedness and the actual preparedness of hospitals. By 
examining participating acute-care hospitals within the state of Tennessee, this study 
contributes to closing this gap. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
It is important to establish clear goals from the onset of the research process. 
Research questions form an integral facet of any study because they serve as a guide for 
the research that will ultimately contribute substantively to the body of existing 
knowledge surrounding the topic of study. As noted earlier, the current state of hospital 
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preparedness within the United States was examined in the current research. The research 
questions were answered via a comprehensive review of existing literature within this 
field of study, along with an analysis of real-time perceptions and attitudes surrounding 
this critical topic so integral to the very health and safety of the American population. 
With consideration to Kingdon’s (2003) theory on streams of the policy 
process—problems, policy, and politics—the following three research questions and 
corresponding hypotheses were central to this study: 
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
Null Hypothesis 1 states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are 
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1 
states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are prepared to manage 
mass disaster incidents. 
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
Null Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient 
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related public-
policy expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED 
managers possess sufficient knowledge and awareness of emergency 
preparedness and related public-policy expectations. 
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
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Null Hypothesis 3 states that first-line ED care providers do not have positive 
perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their 
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 states that first-
line ED care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources, 
capabilities, and training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster. 
The stated research questions were answered with a quantitative approach. This 
methodology was the most beneficial for the study because the data compared were finite 
and represented information and specific factors related to emergency preparedness. The 
factors included, but were not limited to, a clear understanding of related requirements, 
resource availability, and level of training. A published questionnaire served as the 
foundation for a survey designed specifically for this study and was administered to 
access quantitative data on the actual preparedness and awareness of a national response 
framework. Closed-ended questions facilitated the collection of data, enabling a clearer 
understanding of provider perceptions of emergency preparedness (see Appendix A). 
The dependent variable in the current study was emergency preparedness. The 
first set of independent variables were problem streams (i.e., resources, training, 
infrastructure, budget, and recent mass-casualty events; Bascetta, 2010; De-Lorenzo, 
2007; Hsu et al., 2006; Kingdon, 2011; Kiselev, 2010; Niska & Shimizu, 2011). The 
second set of independent variables were policy streams (i.e., knowledge of federal 
policy, knowledge of state and local policy, the development of hospital policy, and the 
availability of disaster plans). The third set of independent variables were politics streams 
(i.e., media relations, notable leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events). A 
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final independent variable was the location of the respective hospitals, in terms of urban, 
suburban, or rural, in order to further define the participating facilities (see McLellan, 
1998). This research was cross cultural through the selection of multiple hospitals. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical framework for the current study was Kingdon’s (2003) multiple 
streams theory, which provides a dynamic systems perspective for explaining why some 
issues command attention generating action by policy makers while others are largely 
ignored or neglected. The Kingdon model consists of three streams—problems, policy, 
and politics. Kingdon has used the term policy window to denote a brief window of 
opportunity for taking action on a given initiative. The greater the degree of convergence 
between problems, policy, and politics, the higher the probability of policy makers and 
leaders acting on an issue. An agenda refers to a list of issues or problems that gain the 
attention of government officials and others close to them at a specific point in time. 
Kingdon (2003) acknowledged myriad negative conditions within problem 
streams. Some problems are projected to center stage while others stagnate. Whether a 
problem rises to the forefront and remains a focus of attention or whether it is eventually 
overshadowed or simply languishes is contingent upon both objective data and the 
intensity of interest the problem provokes. Kingdon coined the term policy entrepreneurs 
to describe those who actively strive to gain the attention and support of government 
officials in order to gain their commitment to act upon issues espoused by entrepreneurs, 
which are then recognized as problems and added to the government agenda. 
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The policy stream consists of ideas and proposals that are distributed for 
discussion within networks composed of a range of actors including lobbyists, 
administrators, academics, researchers, consultants, bureaucrats, journalists, and other 
media figures, as well as congressional staff (Kingdon, 2003). Policy entrepreneurs are 
adept at discerning the opening of a policy window and championing their ideas at that 
pivotal juncture. The practical viability of a proposal, as well as the degree to which it is 
congruent with the values of the policy actors, are key factors of the policy stream. The 
policy stream can essentially be defined by the ability to sell ideas rather than generate 
ideas. 
The third stream of politics is driven by three influential forces the national mood, 
campaigns by special-interest groups, and the ideological leanings of policy makers. 
These forces are all highly dynamic in nature. The national mood can change 
dramatically at any time, and elections produce change in the ideologies of policy 
makers. Kingdon (2003) argued that while pressure groups have the capacity to thwart, 
modify, or support proposals, they have less power to influence agendas than to 
synthesize the national mood toward the prediction of elections. The Kingdon model 
addresses the forces that change the status of problems over time, as well as those that 
propel problems to the forefront. 
Kingdon’s (2003) study involving four waves of interviews conducted from 1976 
through 1979 explored two focal issues—health care and transportation. High- visibility 
healthcare issues included national health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and hospital 
cost containment, which were, ironically, issues again in the forefront during 2013. 
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Disaster/Emergency planning gained prominence with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 
subsequent anthrax threats. These events underscored the critical role of public health 
amid emergencies and served as a collective springboard for actions toward improving 
the capacity of public health and for healthcare facilities to respond during crises (Centers 
for Disease Control [CDC] & Prevention, 2008; Toner et al., 2009). In 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina further highlighted the need for improving disaster/emergency preparedness 
(Adams & Canclini, 2008; ACEP, 2006; JCAHO, 2006b; Rodriguez & Aguirre, 2006; 
Taylor, 2007). The threat of pandemic influenza provided further momentum for medical 
emergency preparedness (Hoffman & Nannini, 2008; Levy, 2009; Lotstein et al., 2008; 
Phillips & Worthington, 2009; Rust et al., 2009). 
Knowlton et al. (2009) conducted a quantitative study on the 2006 California heat 
wave and predicted that intense heat waves would have a powerful impact on morbidity 
and are expected to increase with global warming. This presented another consequent 
need for emergency planning. Most recently, the Joplin, Missouri tornado, Hurricane 
Sandy, and the Boston Marathon bombing brought further awareness to the ongoing need 
for disaster preparedness. Hospital emergency preparedness straddles two broad issues 
that are continually in the public eye—healthcare reform and national security. Katz and 
Levi (2008) argued that public-health emergency preparedness (PHEP) must be an 
integral facet of the discourse on healthcare reform. The Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act of 2006 mandated the development of a national emergency-response 
plan (as cited in Bascetta, 2010); however, there is a sizable gap between this federal 
mandate and actual preparedness (Cherry & Trainer, 2008). The Kingdon (2003) model 
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offers a useful framework for illuminating the factors involved in raising awareness of 
the gap between policy and practice related to hospital emergency preparedness. 
Consequently, the construct is central to the attention and action of policy makers. 
Kingdon’s (2003) theory can effectively explain the progression and momentum 
in policy development; however, further study of organizational behavior informed this 
current research. The work of Lewin (1951) is important in understanding how change 
happens, particularly in light of the many factors that drive change, including the external 
environment. Conversely, there are counterforces that restrain change and, within 
organizations, push to maintain the status quo. This is relative to the current research 
because sudden and catastrophic acts of terrorism, mega storms, and pandemics require, 
among other things, the heightened skills, equipment, and education that will meet the 
needs of supporting organizations. However, these occurrences are random and 
infrequent, and continuous preparedness is costly and labor intensive. Consequently, all 
facets of the driving forces must be considered to increase understanding surrounding 
organizational behavior as it relates to emergency preparedness. The review of literature 
conducted for this study further expands upon these forces, as well as obstacles to 
preparedness. 
Nature of the Study 
The research method selected for this study was quantitative in nature, employing 
a regression model to analyze the relationship between factors affecting hospital 
emergency preparedness. This is consistent with the methodology used in the majority of 
the research reviewed for this study. Data collection involved a questionnaire. This 
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provided the opportunity to assess the level of preparedness within participating hospitals 
and the current state of their EDs in relation to the availability of resources, staff training, 
and related personnel perceptions. The survey facilitated the collection of data pertaining 
to the frequency of ambulance diversion and the capability to flex capacity (see Appendix 
A). The survey questions were designed to also collect data related to provider awareness 
of government expectations surrounding preparedness, as well as their perceptions of the 
ability of their employer hospitals to respond to disasters. The intent behind the current 
study was to highlight the disparity between hospital preparedness and the awareness of 
care providers regarding expectations related to the variables of available resources, staff 
training, and related personnel perceptions. The research clarifies existing problems, 
potential solutions, and suggested policy improvements. The study contributes to the 
creation of an environment conducive to the introduction of effective policy into the 
political stream. 
Definitions 
Definitions of healthcare terms are dynamic, obscure, and vary for many reasons, 
including regional terminology, environmental variables, and regulatory expectations. 
Healthcare terminology is often derived from observation of the state of wellness, illness, 
or injury. Similar to any language, the jargon of the healthcare industry evolved to 
enhance communication. Within the subculture of emergency medicine, due to the 
urgency and criticality of many circumstances, a dialect or language has emerged that is 
specific to meeting the communicative needs within this field. With consideration to 
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these facts, the following definitions are important to add clarity to the content of the 
current study. 
Ambulance diversion: A situation in which a hospital has declared that it does not 
or will not have the necessary capacity or capability to accept additional patients from 
prehospital emergency medical transports. Diversion may be for a specific category or 
type of patient (e.g., trauma, neurosurgery, inpatient, ED, no CT capability, etc.) or 
global, as may occur with total hospital saturation or an internal disaster. (ACEP, 2002, p. 
10). 
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP): The first and largest 
professional organization of emergency-medicine physicians within the United States. 
Disaster: “A situation in which the number of patients presenting to a medical 
facility within a given period exceeds the ability of the hospital to provide care without 
external assistance” (Krajewski, Sztajnkrycer, & Baez, 2005, p. 2). 
Emergency Department (ED): The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
defined an ED as  
any on or off campus [sic] hospital campus [sic] department or facility that meets 
one of the following criteria: 1) it is licensed by the state as an emergency room or 
department; 2) it is held out to the public (by name, signs, advertising, or other 
means) as a place that provides care for emergency medical conditions on a [sic] 
urgent basis without requiring a scheduled appointment; or 3) based on a 
representative sample of patient visits during the previous year, the department or 
facility provides at least one-third [sic] of all its outpatient visits for treating 
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emergency conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a scheduled 
appointment. (Spigel, 2003, p. 1) 
ED overcrowding: There is no one generally accepted definition of ED 
overcrowding. Common perspectives from the literature summarize overcrowding as a 
situation where the demand for emergency care exceeds the ability of the care providers 
and resources of the respective ED. Thus, care cannot be provided to all presenting 
patients within a reasonable amount of time, causing an environment for caregivers 
within which they are too pressured to provide quality care. Derlet et al. (2001) outlined 
the following indicators of ED overcrowding: (a) all ED beds filled more than 6 hours per 
day, (b) admitted patients boarded within the ED due to the unavailability of inpatient 
beds for more than 6 hours per day, and (c) EDs unable to manage new arrivals and hence 
forced to close or divert ambulances to other facilities. 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1985: A 
section of the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, which governs how a 
patient may be refused treatment or transferred from one hospital to another while in an 
unstable medical condition (as cited in Moy, 2011). 
Emergency Support Function # 6: According to the FEMA (2008), “A provision 
of the Disaster Relief Plan that supports mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and 
human services when local, tribal, and state response and recovery needs exceed their 
capabilities” (p. 1). 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): An agency of the U.S. DHS 
that is primarily responsible for coordinating disaster-response efforts within the United 
States (FEMA, 2004). 
Hospital-Incident Command System (HICS): A system developed in 1991 by a 
consortium sponsored by the EMS Authority of California to integrate the tenets of the 
National Incident Management System into a structured system. This system can be 
adapted to scale in order to serve as a foundational management structure for hospital 
incident management (Baker, Smiley, & Schoenthal, 2014). 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO): A 
private, not-for-profit agency providing accreditation to healthcare organizations (Miller-
Keane & O’Toole, 2003). 
National Incident Management System: According to the FEMA (2016), “A 
system developed by the U.S. DHS to provide a standardized systematic approach to 
incident management that is designed to provide an integrated comprehensive response” 
(p. 1). 
National response framework: A guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards 
response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align 
key roles and responsibilities across the country, linking all levels of government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. It is intended to capture specific 
authorities and best practices for managing incidents ranging from serious but purely 




Policy stream: Ideas and proposals distributed for discussion in networks 
composed of a range of actors, including lobbyists, administrators, academics, 
researchers, consultants, bureaucrats, journalists, and other media figures, as well as 
congressional staff (Kingdon, 2003). 
Policy window: According to Kingdon (2003), “The opportunity to launch 
proposals or solutions into the political stream” (p. 166). 
Political stream: Driven by three influential forces—the national mood, the 
campaigns of special-interest groups, and the ideological leanings of policy makers. 
These forces are all highly dynamic in nature. The national mood can change 
dramatically at any time, and elections produce change in the ideologies of policy makers 
(Kingdon, 2003). 
Preparedness: An array of intentional, significant, and decisive tasks and actions 
essential to define, construct, build, sustain, and support the operational capabilities of a 
hospital to avert, shield against, react, and recover from disaster situations (FEMA, 
2004). 
Problems: According to Kingdon (2003), “Conditions that [cause] people [to] 
become convinced that something should be done to change it [sic]” (p. 104). 
Public policy making: According to Kingdon (1989), a set of processes, which 
include at least (a) the setting of the agenda, (b) the specifications of alternatives from 
which a choice is to be made, (c) an authoritative choice among those specified 
alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and (d) the implementation 
of the decision (p. 104). 
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Rural: A location outside a suburban area that may be sparsely populated. A rural 
area is generally unincorporated; an example would be an agricultural area where homes 
are far apart and separated by large parcels of land (McLellan, 1998). 
Suburban: An area that is adjacent or surrounding the center of an urban area or 
city. The suburban area is often a residential area with single-family homes (McLellan, 
1998). 
Surge capacity: According to a government report entitled Bioterrorism and 
Health System Preparedness (2007), “A healthcare system’s ability to expand quickly to 
meet an increased demand for medical care in the event of bioterrorism or other large-
scale public health emergencies” (p. 2). 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS): The principal 
agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services 
(U.S. DHHS, 2008). 
Urban: An area characterized as the center of an incorporated community or 
municipality with a population of 2,500 or greater (McLellan, 1998). 
Assumptions 
I am a healthcare professional with many years of experience in the 
administration of a variety of hospitals with proven clinical expertise in the specialty of 
emergency medicine and trauma within both rural and urban settings. For purposes of the 
current study, I made the assumption that EDs are not fully prepared to manage all 
hazards. I also assumed that the ED nurse manager or director is the most knowledgeable 
individual within the hospital to relate the state of preparedness within their respective 
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facility due to the scope and exposure of their roles. Additionally, I assumed that public-
policy expectations exist for emergency preparedness and that providers of emergency 
care are aware of such expectations. This study was also conducted under the assumption 
that the participating EDs had the resources, policies, training, and other capabilities in 
place to effectively respond to disasters and that the primary providers of emergency care 
had confidence in these capabilities. 
Scope, Delimitations, and Limitations 
The research problem of interest in the current study was the gap between the 
expectation of all-hazards preparation and the actual level of preparedness within U.S. 
hospitals. The ability of a sample of hospitals to respond to a disaster was assessed. More 
specifically, I compared resources such as space, staff, supplies, communication 
capabilities, decontamination facilities, flex capacity, and the availability of protective 
equipment. Additionally, I explored the research problem from the perspectives of 
nursing leaders and their awareness of government expectations, their related education, 
and their ability to manage a disaster within their EDs. 
The population sample of this study included the nurse leaders (i.e., managers of 
Tennessee hospitals) who provide emergency services. This ensured a range between 
small, rural, and critical-access hospitals, as well as between major metropolitan and 
academic research hospitals. The term all-hazards, when used within the context of 
preparedness, implies that a hospital will have the resources and capabilities to manage 
all hazards or any type of disaster that could occur within its service area. An example 
would be a chemical spill. There may be no chemical plant located within a community; 
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however, it may be highly probable that a tractor-trailer truck carrying a toxic pesticide 
could travel through the community and become involved in a motor-vehicle collision 
releasing hazardous chemicals. Without the appropriate training, antidotes, protective 
equipment, and decontamination facilities, the outcome could be fatal to both community 
members and hospital staff. However, in times of overcrowding, low reimbursements, 
and hospital closures, disaster preparedness is forced to a low priority by more pressing 
needs. 
Kingdon (2011) specified a window of time when public interest allows a topic to 
be moved forward due to a current public agenda that applies to the respective problem. 
With disaster preparedness, that window is immediately following an event or disaster. 
Each time a disaster of scale occurs, the window opens and advances in preparedness are 
accomplished; however, as soon as the community begins to return to normal, that 
window closes, and resources dissipate. Disasters are not isolated to any one location. 
Although particular locales have higher probabilities of experiencing a disaster, the 
expectation of all-hazards preparedness applies to all hospitals that support an ED. 
Therefore, the potential to generalize the findings of this research exists. It is therefore 
recommended that similar study be conducted in other geographical areas to validate the 
findings. 
The following limitations were expected in the current study: 
1. The research was limited to EDs within the state of Tennessee; hence, the 
findings may be subject to some form of undetected bias that is not 
representative of all EDs across the United States. 
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2. Variability may exist in the background of the designated emergency- 
preparedness officer at a participating hospital. In some cases, it is a clinical 
employee, such as the ED nurse manager, and in other cases, it is a nonclinical 
employee such as the director of security.   
3. Answers to survey questions generally reflect the comprehension, experience, 
and view of the respondents. Varying degrees of knowledge, including lack of 
direct knowledge, may lead to distortion of the research problem and 
responses that do not accurately represent the true data. 
4. The intentional misrepresentation of data provided by respondents cannot be 
controlled (e.g., some hospitals may be reluctant to disclose their true state of 
preparedness). 
Significance of the Study and State of the Field and Theory 
The significance of the current study includes the potential for the findings to 
demonstrate that, although the standard of hospital disaster preparedness has improved 
since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, it is still not fail-proof. 
Preparedness, in many cases, still does not meet the expectations outlined in the national 
response framework (U.S. DHS, 2008). Unexpected natural or man-made disasters have 
become a reality across the United States. In light of this realization, it is of interest to 
many stakeholders to know the disaster-management capabilities of hospitals, including 
the preparation and resources enabling their effective response to large-scale disasters.  
In this study, I compared the expectations outlined in the national response 
framework to the reality of compliance within a sample of EDs in the United States. The 
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implications of the findings led to recommendations of a minimum standard of 
preparedness for public policy and the resources needed to adhere to the 
recommendations. The results of this research can benefit healthcare providers and policy 
makers, as well as the community at large, as the actual level of disaster-response 
capabilities become known. The findings may contribute to the overall state of hospital 
emergency preparedness by going beyond simply identifying gaps in capabilities and 
available resources. The survey questions were designed to glean the perceptions of 
department leaders as to the state of preparedness within their facilities. It is these leaders 
who will be expected to deliver care during a disaster. The findings provide valuable 
insight into hospital capabilities from the perspectives of the end users. 
Practice and Social Change 
The significance of the current study to practice is the glaring reality that a 
disaster—natural or manmade—can occur at any time within any community. To best 
meet the needs of community citizens, a minimum, sustainable standard of preparedness 
must be in place that is consistently supported, resourced, reviewed, and updated. A solid 
action plan with ready resources will provide a safety net in the form of provider and 
community confidence. Attempting to assemble supplies and train staff at the time of a 
disaster serve only to increase the inevitable damage and loss of life. 
The objective behind this research was to elicit positive social change in the form 
of creating increased awareness as Americans are exposed to, and become increasingly 
concerned about, manmade or natural disasters. The problem is exemplified with the past 
threat of the Ebola virus. The threat, as well as the comprehensive resources required to 
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isolate and treat victims, were shared with the American public. The reality was that the 
resources needed to screen and isolate even one Ebola patient would stress the 
capabilities of most community hospitals. This was a concerning realization when 
Americans had complete confidence in community resources to manage such a disaster. 
This study contributes to social change by increasing the understanding of the 
actual state of preparedness, as well as identifying gaps causing shortfalls when 
preparedness is compared with expectations. With this knowledge, recommendations can 
be made to develop standards of preparedness that will bridge these gaps; create greater 
and more accurate awareness; and support the development of standardized, 
comprehensive emergency-preparedness systems. The ideal system will be better 
prepared to handle all hazards and large-scale events. This study serves as a tool in 
support of the development of public policy enabling an effective and sustainable system 
of preparedness. 
Summary and Transition 
The provided background of the research problem included a snapshot of the 
progression of government involvement in disaster/emergency preparedness from 1803 to 
date. Following the events of 9/11, voluminous activities surrounding emergency 
preparedness ensued including government funding for public-health preparedness. The 
relationship to the condition of EDs in the United States has been described in terms of 
ED closures, patient boarding, overcrowding, and ambulance diversions. Daily 
occurrences within many such facilities increase concern regarding the capability of 
hospital EDs to manage disasters. The purpose of this study was to examine the gap 
33 
 
between effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and 
perceptions of healthcare providers. The findings may spur renewed interest in 
emergency-preparedness policy and create opportunities for positive policy change (see 
Kingdon, 2011). 
Chapter 2 provides a description and summary of past research related to 
emergency preparedness. The selected articles and documents were chosen due to their 
relationship and pertinence to the research problem and content that could potentially 
lead to answering the research questions. The review of literature includes, but is not 
limited to, the state of EDs within the United States, hospital emergency preparedness, 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This review of existing literature pertinent to the current topic of study is provided 
to build upon the background introduced on hospital emergency preparedness within the 
United States. The review addresses the historical evolution of disaster preparedness 
within this country (Altevogt, Stroud, Hanson, Hanfling, & Gostin, 2009), the 
expectations of regulatory agencies on emergency preparedness (EMTALA of 1985; 
Moy, 2011), and funding sources (De-Lorenzo, 2007; Toner et al., 2009). Literature is 
also reviewed that addresses recommendations related to ED capabilities and 
impediments to accomplishing effective disaster preparedness (see Derlet & Richards, 
2000; Duley, 2005). A comprehensive discussion of the theoretical construct forming the 
basis for this current study is presented. This discussion leads to evidence of a structural 
and systematic process by which EDs can be better prepared for states of disaster such as 
acts of terrorism or unforeseen natural disasters. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The majority of the literature reviewed for this current study related to emergency 
preparedness and its various components. In the practice of emergency medical care, as 
well as disaster preparedness, multiple components contribute to the state of 
preparedness. They include, but are not limited to, the availability of resources, staff 
training, procedures, and hospital capacity. Caring for sick or injured individuals is 
complex and requires a variety of commonly recognized supplies such as dressings and 
medicines; however, foundational basics are also important such as a safe, clean space for 
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care that is thermally controlled, private, and well lit. Adequate numbers of appropriately 
trained and skilled staff are essential to manage large numbers of patients who are 
critically ill or injured. 
The largest body of staff who care for patients in a disaster situation at a hospital 
are nurses. Contrary to common perceptions external to the healthcare field, a nurse 
cannot be placed into any situation or function. Nurses are specialists, and ED nurses are 
even more highly specialized, with a set of skills unique to the type of care they deliver 
and the environment within which they work. Technology also varies from one specialty 
to another. Health care has evolved dramatically and is highly dependent upon 
computerized processes to aid with every facet of care from registering patients to 
advanced diagnostics. In this review of related literature, I examine publications focused 
on topics such as the needed surge capacity to meet the influx of a large number of 
patients in a system that is already overcrowded (Adams, 2009; Kelen   et al., 2006). 
Ambulance diversion to alternative locations is also addressed (JCAHO, 2006b), and 
research centered in the need for specialty training and methods for mobilizing additional 
staff is reviewed (Bascetta, 2010; Schultz & Stratton, 2007). 
Relationships and interoperability between community agencies, such as local 
health departments, are topics of discussion throughout existing literature (Braun et al., 
2006). Emphasis is clearly on communication and conducting multiagency drills and 
exercises to identify weaknesses and create vital opportunities to correct them during the 
planning phase rather than during an actual event. The expectation is that all hospitals 
will be prepared at all times for all hazards. As has been exposed within existing 
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literature (ACEP, 2006, 2009), this is far from the case in many organizations. Such 
preparation is costly, and many hospitals across the country are experiencing financial 
constraints, forcing the prioritization of resource allocation. The likely decision is to 
direct available resources to the patients at hand, with minimal provision for potentialities 
such as emergency preparedness. 
Both primary and secondary sources were located for this literature review 
through a variety of resources. The online library at Walden University served as the 
primary means of gaining access to relevant information related to the topic; however, 
local libraries were used as needed. Internet search engines were also accessed; literature 
was drawn from PubMed and the following EBSCO databases: Academic Search 
Premier, MasterFILE Premier, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, and MEDLINE. 
Keywords used for the literature search in this study included—either individually 
or in conjunction—care, communication, community, emergency, disaster, emergency 
department, health, hospitals, nurses, nursing, physicians, planning, policy, 
preparedness, readiness, response, resources, surge capacity, training, and medicine. 
This was followed by a search under additional topics as pertinent areas of interest 
emerged. Sources were catalogued by completing an in-depth bibliographical list that 
also incorporated secondary searches through the online library at Walden University, 
various websites describing EDs within major hospitals throughout Tennessee, and other 
publications focused on the area of emergency preparedness. 
Hospital Emergency Preparedness 
Historically, disaster preparedness has focused on the provision of food, shelter, 
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and financial resources to displaced individuals and repairing damage to the physical 
infrastructure following a disaster. However, preparedness is much broader and 
dependent upon the availability of resources; the training of responders; the 
organizational, regional, and federal infrastructure; and the respective budget or finances 
(Bascetta, 2010; De-Lorenzo, 2007; Hsu et al., 2006; Kingdon, 2011; Kiselev, 2010; 
Niska & Shimizu, 2011; Toner et al., 2009). Minimal attention has been given to 
healthcare needs beyond first aid and field triage. Issues related to expanding hospital-
surge capacity and coordinating healthcare and first-response networks in the aftermath 
of disaster were largely perceived as irrelevant within the United States throughout the 
majority of the 20th Century. Prior to 2009, the emergency-preparedness standards of the 
Joint Commission (2009) related primarily to physical-plant threats such as floods, fire, 
and loss of electrical power. Such threats were placed in the same category as safety, 
security, and infection control. Preparedness for multiple casualties typically centered on 
the response of individual EDs. 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, awareness of chemical and biological weapons, 
as well as the threat of their use in terrorist attacks, drew concurrent attention to the need 
for hospital disaster planning (Toner et al., 2009). Over the same decade, the 1993 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, along with a series of natural disasters including 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and two earthquakes in California (i.e., Loma Prieta in 1989 
and Northridge in 1994), further heightened awareness of the critical importance of 
hospital emergency preparedness. However, it was not until the attacks on the World 
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Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11 that serious inadequacies in the existing 
emergency-response system were clearly exposed. Problems with communication, data 
management, patient tracking, staffing, supplies, and overcrowding were rampant. 
Bellevue Hospital, the premier Level I trauma center in New York, was plagued with 
these issues. The New York University Downtown Hospital lost utility services and had 
water pressure reduced to dangerous levels (Phillips & Worthington, 2009). 
In 2002, the U.S. DHHS established the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) 
with the aim of enhancing the capacity of hospitals and other healthcare systems to 
prepare for, and respond to, public-health emergencies, including bioterrorist attacks, 
natural disasters, and pandemic influenza (Toner et al., 2009). Top priorities currently 
include bolstering the capabilities of hospitals in domains such as interoperable 
communication systems, personnel management, bed tracking, fatality-management 
planning, and hospital-evaluation planning. Earlier priorities included expanding bed and 
staffing surge capacity, decontamination capabilities, isolation capacity, pharmaceutical 
supplies, education, and training exercises and drills. 
In 2007, the U.S. DHHS commissioned a comprehensive 2-year project 
evaluating hospital preparedness from the inception of the HPP in 2002 through mid-
2007 (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). In addition to assessing the changes through that 
period, the findings were applied to the development of tools and strategies for future 
evaluation. Toner et al. (2009) presented evaluation data based upon the 2008 descriptive 
framework that emerged from their study. This framework is a conceptual model of 
preparedness for mass-casualty events, formed by local and regional healthcare systems 
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delineating the essential components of hospital disaster preparedness. The evaluation 
report was drawn from in-depth interviews with 133 health officials and hospital 
clinicians representing 50 states, the largest cities in the nation, and major U.S. territories, 
along with analyses of relevant literature, government reports, and HPP program 
assessments. 
The findings of the U.S. DHHS project indicated significant improvements in the 
disaster preparedness of individual hospitals since launch of the HPP (as cited in Toner et 
al., 2009). The improvements included more detailed and comprehensive disaster plans; 
coordinated efforts with community agencies in some locations; more formal disaster-
training protocols; stockpiling of emergency supplies, resources, and equipment; and 
more frequent, higher quality drills. One of the most important improvements was the 
emergence of healthcare coalitions involving networking and other forms of collaboration 
between hospitals, public-health departments, and emergency management and response 
officials. One such coalition is the Bethesda Hospital Emergency Partnership Plan 
introduced in 2004 (Phillips & Worthington, 2009). This involves three adjacent hospitals 
within the Washington, DC area—the National Naval Medical Center; the National 
Institutes of Health Clinical Center; and Suburban Hospital, a nonprofit community 
facility. The emergency response of hospitals to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon was 
severely inadequate (Toner et al., 2009). The Bethesda Hospital Partnership Plan is 
considered a model program and efforts are currently underway to adapt it to other 
localities (Phillips & Worthington, 2009). 
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The evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS demonstrated that U.S. 
hospital emergency preparedness remains in a preliminary phase with ample room for 
improvement (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). The establishment of standards and 
protocols for accommodating mass casualties represents an unprecedented departure from 
conventional healthcare practices and poses complex clinical, legal, and ethical 
challenges. Toner et al. (2009) noted that this daunting task requires leadership and 
direction at national, state, and local levels. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) recently 
issued guidelines for establishing crisis standards of medical care for implementation 
during disaster situations (as cited in Altevogt et al., 2009). The evaluation report 
revealed that the most effective metrics for quantifying the degree of hospital 
preparedness rely upon clearly defined indicators and were not unduly cumbersome to 
implement (Toner et al., 2009). Some of the most useful metrics included numerical 
surge capacity and capability targets, staff training, and staff performance during 
exercises and real-life events. 
The evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS recommended the use of 
JCAHO standards for emergency management in conjunction with the HPP guidelines 
because the two publications overlap (as cited in Toner et al., 2009). The JCAHO (2006a) 
outlined a preliminary set of standards for emergency-management planning, infection 
control, and disaster response in 2006. These standards were subsequently refined and 
expanded during 2008 (as cited in Soloff, 2008). The revised emergency-management 
standards were derived from 5 years of detailed investigation by JCAHO into the range of 
natural and artificial disasters that have affected healthcare organizations, including the 
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terrorist attacks of 9/11, hurricanes, floods, and extensive utility outages. Based upon this 
research, JCAHO concluded that planning for a single event is deeply inadequate and 
healthcare organizations “should be able to demonstrate sufficient flexibility to respond 
effectively to combinations of escalating events” (p. 3). 
One highly recommended technique for enhancing and maintaining emergency 
preparedness is performing a thorough gap analysis as part of the emergency-
management program of the respective organization (Emergency Preparedness, 2010). A 
complete gap analysis includes the following four steps: 
1. Identifying planning scenarios including the expected number of casualties for 
each scenario. 
2. Developing requirements. 
3. Charting existing resources and capabilities. 
4. Identifying the gap between existing resources and capabilities and the total 
requirements needed for each planning scenario, as well as advancing the plan 
forward to the next-highest support agency.  
Veterans Administration Medical Centers perform gap analyses to bolster their 
capabilities in serving veterans and local communities during emergencies. 
One of the conclusions of the evaluation report commissioned by the U.S. DHHS 
is the need for sustained and increased HPP funding (Toner et al., 2009). Toner et al. 
(2009) acknowledged that significant declines in funding levels would likely delay or 
hinder progress in hospital preparedness and indefinitely set back the ability of the United 
States to effectively manage mass casualties in the aftermath of catastrophic emergencies. 
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These researchers also noted that hospitals are investing their own material resources in 
emergency preparedness but cannot be expected to independently build upon and 
improve their capabilities without external funding. The critical importance of sustained 
funding is continually reiterated throughout related literature (Bascetta, 2010; Cherry & 
Trainer, 2008; Is the Medical Community Ready, 2010). 
The State of Emergency Medicine 
In 2006, the ACEP issued the first national report card on the state of emergency 
medicine. The national grade was a C– (ACEP, 2006). Many deficiencies included lack 
of resources, particularly a lack of access to resources. Three years later, the 2009 report 
card issued the same C– grade (ACEP, 2009). This report was designed to address the 
realities of the dual role of EDs as providers of emergency care in crisis situations and the 
safety net for individuals with no other point of access to medical care. The report built 
upon the 2006 version, drawing data from the most current sources to assess ED care on 
five dimensions. Based upon 116 metrics, the following five dimensions were weighted 
to obtain a grade for each state and the District of Columbia, as well as the United States 
as a whole: (a) access to emergency care (30%), (b) the quality and patient-safety 
environment (20%), (c) the medical-liability environment (20%), (d) public health and 
injury prevention (15%), and (e) disaster preparedness (15%). 
The ACEP (2009) perceived the results of the described 2009 report card as 
troubling. The scores of individual states ranged from a B for Massachusetts to a D– for 
Arkansas. Of the five categories, the United States earned the lowest score on the most 
vital aspect of emergency management—access to care, scoring a dismal D– for this 
43 
 
category. The overall conclusion is that the needs of a growing and aging U.S. population 
far exceed the number of existing hospital EDs. The ACEP task force emphasized that 
this dimension of the report card encompasses the most important aspects of emergency 
care. 
The United States earned a grade of C+ on the dimension of quality and patient-
safety environment on the ACEP 2009 report card. The ACEP task force found that the 
states varied tremendously on this measure. Notably, states that earned high grades in this 
dimension typically had sufficiently funded EMS systems with protocols designed to 
provide a quick response during life-threatening conditions. These states also tended to 
monitor quality measures, track negative events, and utilize electronic medical records to 
a greater degree than other states. 
The United States received a C– on the ACEP 2009 report card in the category of 
medical-liability environment, another area of wide variability among states. Data 
conducive to objective evaluation were difficult to obtain on this measure. The nation 
earned a C on public health and injury prevention. The task force noted that preventable 
injuries and illnesses remain key contributors to unnecessary morbidity, mortality, and 
disability. In spite of empirically sound, cost-efficient strategies for public-health 
promotion, the United States lagged behind other developed nations in reducing 
morbidity and mortality. 
Disaster preparedness was a new dimension for the 2009 edition of the ACEP 
report card. It was added to capture the disaster-planning initiatives that were becoming 
more tightly woven into the emergency-care system. The United States scored a C+ in 
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this category. The task force obtained some of the state-specific data on this dimension 
through a comprehensive survey of the states and District of Columbia because the 
information was not yet available on a federal level. This dimension targets four major 
areas essential to an effective medical-disaster response—state coordination, hospital 
capacity, availability of trained staff, and funding. These aspects of disaster preparedness 
continue to evolve (Bascetta, 2010; Braun et. al., 2006; Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Toner   
et al., 2009). 
The ACEP report card confirmed the rampant criticism that federal funding for 
disaster preparedness was inadequate (as cited in Cherry & Trainer, 2008). The College 
noted that a scant 4% of U.S. DHS funding is devoted to emergency medical-system 
preparedness (ACEP, 2009). To compensate, many states have invested heavily in 
systems and infrastructures enabling a rapid and effective response to natural or artificial 
disasters. High-performing states typically have high per capita federal funding for 
disaster response. They also have formal all-hazards medical-response protocols or 
Emergency Support Function #8 plans, which are typically shared with EMS and key 
hospital personnel. These states have fairly high numbers of nurses and doctors registered 
in an emergency system for advanced credentialing of volunteer health professionals, 
have created effective communication and notification systems, and hold drills and 
training consistent with JCAHO standards (JCAHO, 2006a; Soloff, 2008). 
The ACEP (2009) deemed the U.S. grade of C+ a reflection of inadequate funding 
for the critical need of frontline medical providers, as well as an absence of consistent 
direction by the federal government despite efforts invested in emergency care by many 
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states. Based upon their findings, the ACEP presented the following eight 
recommendations for improving the state of emergency care: 
1. Establish stronger EDs as part of national healthcare reform. 
2. Reduce ED boarding and hospital crowding. 
3. Pass the Access to EMS Act of 2009. 
4. Enact state and federal reforms for medical liability. 
5. Channel a greater proportion of federal funding and support into disaster 
preparedness focused on emergency medical preparedness and response. 
6. Expand support for the U.S. healthcare safety net. 
7. Create mechanisms for bolstering the coordination of emergency services. 
8. Increase the utilization of systems, standards, and information technology to 
monitor and improve the patient-safety environment. 
The ACEP concluded that the national emergency healthcare system is in grim condition, 
calling upon emergency-care professionals, government officials, and private citizens to 
scrutinize the report card of the respective states with the goal of identifying problem 
areas and actively supporting endeavors to improve the system. 
Emergency Department Overcrowding 
One of the top priorities of the JCAHO (2004a) for improving emergency 
capabilities is establishing standards for emergency-room care. ED overcrowding 
standards were introduced in the Leadership chapter of the 2004 Hospital Accreditation 
Manual published by the Commission (JCAHO, 2004b). Tantamount to this factor is the 
issue of adequate resources. In the case of emergency preparedness, resources encompass 
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far more than medical supplies and extend into appropriate space, equipment, and human 
resources such as qualified medical staff. ED overcrowding gained initial attention during 
the 1980s and awareness increased over the following decade (ACEP, 2006, 2008, 2009; 
Kellerman, 2006). Impediments to alleviating the situation included lack of a clear 
definition in terms of what constitutes overcrowding and inadequate understanding of its 
causes. Ambulance diversion is a common practice for addressing overcrowded EDs; 
however, this is, ultimately, an ineffective solution. 
Cherry and Trainer (2008) explicitly posited that EDs serve the dual purpose of 
acting as the primary point of access for universal health care and as the critical safety net 
for emergency medical care. A report by the IOM (2006) found that the demand for 
emergency care escalated by 26% between 1993 and 2003; however, during the same 
time period, both the number of EDs and the number of hospital beds declined. Patients 
admitted to the hospital were frequently boarded within the ED until an inpatient bed was 
available, which was for 48 hours or longer due to hospital-wide overcrowding. In 2003, 
ambulances were diverted at an average of once every minute, often resulting in patients 
being transferred to facilities with less-than-optimal care for their needs. 
The ACEP (2008) task force reported that hospital EDs have not adapted to major 
changes that have occurred since the 1990s. With the exception of hospitals that have 
undertaken strategic efforts to alleviate crowding, most continue to staff their EDs in the 
same way these departments were staffed during the 1960s (i.e., Monday through Friday; 
business hours; with limited staffing on evenings, nights, and weekends). This practice is 
severely outdated with the present role of the ED, which is to serve as the universal 
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access point for medical care. Consequently, this is a key contributing factor to the 
problem of ED capacity. The task force also found that, despite having the ability to 
predict ED crowding, the majority of hospitals fail to anticipate and prepare for the 
probable volume of patient admissions the following day. An antiquated structure is 
implicated that perpetuates ED crowding and compromises patient safety and care. 
The ACEP (2008) task force outlined several high-impact solutions to address the 
conditions that perpetuate ED overcrowding. The first was to move emergency patients 
out of the ED to inpatient areas including hallways and conference rooms when 
necessary. The second recommended solution was coordinating the discharge of hospital 
patients before noon, a practice that has been found to significantly ease patient flow. The 
third solution was coordinating schedules for elective-surgery patients. Other potential 
solutions include bedside registration of patients, creating “fast track” units, creating 
observation units, establishing a physician-triage process, and canceling elective 
surgeries. However, each of these potential solutions presents drawbacks such as 
additional costs or the potential for the strategy to ease ED overcrowding but result in 
impediments to patient flow in other areas of the hospital. 
The most effective strategy for easing ED overcrowding actually addresses the 
overall issue of emergency care by establishing a coordinated regional system that 
operates under national standards (IOM, 2006). The IOM (2006), as well as other 
sources, have emphasized that hospitals have been slow to capitalize on information 
technologies for managing patient care. Electronic medical records are essential for 
ensuring that patients undergoing treatment for cancer or other serious conditions 
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continue to receive appropriate treatment during a disaster (Tariman, 2007). 
Communication systems are a major weakness in emergency preparedness (IOM, 2006; 
JCAHO, 2006b; Soloff, 2008). Poor communication between EDs, EMS, and trauma 
centers results in problematic management flow (IOM, 2006). The lack of coordinated 
communication networks leaves some EDs severely overcrowded while others are empty. 
A shortage of health professionals is implicated as a key factor in ED 
overcrowding (ACEP, 2009; Kellerman, 2006). Shortages exist in both ED nurses and 
physicians; however, primary care and various specialties also experience shortfalls. The 
number of trauma cases increased between 1990 and 2002 while the number of 
neurosurgeons declined (IOM, 2006). Kellerman (2006) argued that addressing the 
shortages of ED physicians and nurses should be a top priority for government funding. 
ED personnel have affirmed the severity of the shortages and the vital importance of 
giving precedence to staffing issues. According to the ACEP (2009), one ED physician 
declared, “Our hospital emergency departments are feeling the impact of hospital crises, 
nursing shortages, and physician shortages that are leading to boarding across the entire 
state and affect every hospital from the smallest rural hospital to the largest tertiary 
facility” (p. 3). Shortages seem to affect both large and small hospitals. 
The IOM (2006) views government funding as essential to improving pediatric 
emergency care. Neither EDs nor EMS are equipped to provide adequate care for 
pediatric patients. Children account for 27% of ED visits, while only 6% of U.S. EDs are 
equipped for pediatric emergencies. This becomes especially critical during disasters 
when children are more vulnerable to conditions such as dehydration. Following 
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Hurricane Katrina, children were especially susceptible to gastrointestinal problems 
(JCAHO, 2006b). Yet, the unique needs of this population have been largely overlooked  
in disaster planning. 
The annual survey of the American Hospital Association (2010) revealed that, in 
2010, the EDs of nearly half of all urban and teaching hospitals were at or over capacity. 
The average for all hospitals is 38% capacity. Nearly one quarter (22%) of all hospitals 
reported experiencing time on diversion status within the year preceding the survey. The 
highest diversion rates were reported for urban (45%) and teaching (38%) hospitals. The 
major cause for the ED diversion was an inadequate number of staffed critical-care beds 
(42%), followed by ED overcrowding (27%). 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, roughly half (49%) of the hospitals surveyed 
by the AHA (2010) reported improvements in hospital diversion over the year preceding 
the 2010 survey, while only 11% reported higher rates of diversion. Many hospitals 
concurrently found it increasingly difficult to maintain on-call physician coverage within 
the ED. The IOM (2006) cited this as a serious problem. Half of the hospitals surveyed 
pay physicians for on-call ED coverage, and the same proportion reported increased 
expenditures in this area (AHA, 2010). A comparable proportion of the responding 
hospitals had increased their number of staff physicians, the most common strategy 
employed to expand ED coverage. 
Emergency care can no longer be viewed as the province of individual EDs. The 
general consensus of both government agencies and professional organizations is that a 
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coordinated and accountable system of emergency care is necessary. Achieving this 
requires federal funding and support. 
Early warning systems. Early warning systems are an integral resource 
component of a coordinated strategic approach to disaster/emergency response planning. 
Hoot and Aronsky (2006) described an early warning system as having two essential 
features—a clearly defined crisis period and a mechanism for predicting crises. These 
researchers defined a crisis period as a range of time when ambulance diversion is 
employed to deal with ED overcrowding. At their medical center, ambulance diversion 
was permitted when the situation met one of the following three criteria that was not 
expected to abate within 1 hour: (a) all critical-care ED beds are occupied, patients are 
waiting in hallways, and at least 10 patients are waiting for care; (b) the acuity level 
places an additional number of patients at risk; and (c) all monitored ED beds are full. 
Hoot and Aronsky (2006) tested two conceptual models of ED overcrowding that 
reliably predicted the described overcrowding 1 hour in advance. One model is the ED 
work index, which was derived from the expert opinions of ED staff and aligned with the 
perceptions of nurses and physicians regarding crowding. The second model—the 
National ED Overcrowding Scale—is a linear-regression model that links five 
operational variables with the extent of crowding as appraised by doctors and nurses. 
Following their logistical-regression comparison of multiple early warning 
systems, Hoot and Aronsky (2006) noted that the extra hour of advance warning allows 
hospitals to initiate ambulance diversion with very few false alarms. The advance notice 
provides hospital staff and administrators an opportunity to take action before the quality 
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of patient care is compromised. Potential courses of action include contacting reserve 
personnel, opening auxiliary treatment bays, freeing hospital beds, or deferring care for 
low-risk patients. The key advantage is that “administrators can be proactive, rather than 
merely reactive, in the face of an overcrowding crisis” (p. 342). Hoot and Aronsky 
emphasized that an early warning system is intended to alleviate ED overcrowding in 
routine situations and does not address mass-casualty events. Nevertheless, the potential 
responses to an early warning alert are applicable to a surge situation within the context 
of a coordinated disaster-response network. 
Expanding surge capacity. Historically, the study of surge capacity was 
primarily the province of military medicine, emergency medicine, and public health 
(Adams, 2009). Adams (2009) noted that there remains no conclusive definition of surge 
capacity. Using concept analysis, she undertook a literature search using the keyword 
surge capacity. A conceptual analysis produced the 4 Ss—staff, “stuff,” structure, and 
systems. Staff encompasses personnel, stuff refers to supplies and equipment, structure 
denotes the physical facilities, and systems refers to integrated management policy and 
processes. The 4 Ss can be considered the defining attributes or characteristics of surge 
capacity, based upon their prevalence within that context. 
Adams (2009) posited that it may be simpler to define surge capacity in terms of 
what it is not rather than what it is. Specifically, surge capacity is not static and does not 
represent routine operations or care. Based upon the described conceptual analysis, 
Adams defined surge capacity as “the ability to obtain adequate staff, supplies, . . . 
equipment, structures and systems to provide sufficient care to meet immediate needs of 
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an influx of patients following a large-scale incident or disaster” (p. 1). Adams called for 
further study to refine the definition according to the type of event generating the surge 
and the perspectives of different stakeholder groups including patients and evacuees. The 
more specific the definition of surge capacity, the more conducive it is to facilitate the 
establishment of objective measurements. 
Hospital care under surge conditions. Kelen et al. (2006) explored the concept 
of reverse triage; namely, the identification of hospital patients who could be safely 
discharged in order to accommodate a surge of patients with serious acute-care needs 
following a mass-casualty event. In the military, reverse triage refers to treating soldiers 
with less serious injuries first so they can more rapidly return to battle. Its application to 
civilian patient care is unusual but could be a viable option for expanding surge capacity. 
The Kelen et al. quantitative research was conducted for the purpose of developing a 
classification system for evaluating the suitability of hospital patients as candidates for 
early discharge, according to their “risk tolerance of a consequential medical event as a 
result of discharge” (p. 1984). 
The initial phase of the Kelen et al. (2006) study consisted of the following three 
key steps: 
1. Conceptualizing the dispositional classification system. 
2. Developing operational definitions of consequential medical events and 
critical interventions. 
3. Calculating risk estimates based upon a multidisciplinary expert panel. 
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The expert panel was composed of 27 practicing clinicians (i.e., physicians, nurses, and a 
nurse practitioner) and 12 nonclinicians or nonpracticing clinicians representing a broad 
array of related disciplines (i.e., disaster management, homeland security, disaster and 
military triage, risk management, public health, and hospital administration). The 
panelists participated in a warfare-analysis exercise and were asked to develop responses 
to questions involving the creation of the disposition classification system. Those with 
clinical experience were asked to rate on a scale of 1 through 10 the probability of 
withdrawing or withholding a critical intervention and the medical consequences. 
The Kelen et al. (2006) panel members unanimously endorsed a five-category 
disposition classification system. For patients within the minimum-risk group, the upper 
limit for risk tolerance in the event of early discharge was 4%. In the next-lowest risk 
category, the upper limit was approximately 12%, followed by 33% for the moderate-risk 
category. The upper limit for the high-risk category was 60%, and for very high-risk 
patients was between 95% or 100%. The panelists also developed a list of 28 critical 
interventions with a probability of resulting in a consequential medical event if 
discontinued. The impact of discontinuing the interventions was ranked between 3 and 10 
on a 10-point scale. Kelen et al. noted that the level of risk tolerance the panelists derived 
for the two lowest risk categories are lower than the actual risk of adverse events for 
discharged hospital patients, which has been reported as high as 19% in the first 3 weeks 
following discharge. The development of the disposition classification system was the 
first stage of the project, which is designed to produce and validate clinical criteria for 
making real-time decisions for early discharge in response to a patient surge. 
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A task force on mass critical care developed a framework for providing 
emergency mass critical care (EMCC) in response to a surge event (Rubinson et al., 
2008). Although the creation of the task force was “triggered” by the potential for a 
serious influenza pandemic, the framework can be adapted across crisis situations. The 
task force outlined several broad recommendations. They proposed that all hospitals with 
an intensive-care unit prepare to provide EMCC in a coordinated effort with regional-
hospital planning. The task force strongly advocated for the development of healthcare 
coalitions. They also recommended the rigorous application of metrics including the 
development of precise benchmarks for mass-casualty surge capacity. 
The task force on mass critical care also recommended that hospitals with 
intensive-care units plan and prepare for the provision of EMCC on a daily basis during 
the response period for a patient population at least triple the typical capacity for an 
intensive-care unit (Rubinson et al., 2008). They also suggested that hospitals prepare to 
provide EMCC for 10 consecutive days without the need for external medical assistance 
and offered suggestions for adapting specific critical-care procedures. The EMCC 
framework is consistent with the IOM (2006) standards of care during crisis (Altevogt    
et al., 2009). 
Disaster-response hospitals. In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, several 
alternate health facilities, ranging from a veterinary hospital to an empty retail store, were 
established as surge hospitals (JCAHO, 2006b). The “Katrina Clinic” was set up in 
Reliant Arena, next to the Houston Astrodome, by the Harris County Hospital District. It 
was operated and staffed in collaboration with medical doctors and faculty from Baylor 
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College of Medicine and other medical volunteers from the area. A call for medical 
volunteers elicited 2,700 responses. With dedicated staff and donated supplies and 
equipment, the facility rapidly expanded, processing more than 10,000 patients over 15 
days. Acutely ill patients were sent to local hospitals. Most clinic treatment was for 
chronic conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and asthma. Treatment unique 
to the situation included the provision of thousands of immunizations and treating 
gastrointestinal infections eventually identified as the Norwalk virus. A second clinic 
opened at the George R. Brown Convention Center where more than 9,000 additional 
patients were processed. Katrina Clinic operated for weeks at a cost of $4.1 million and, 
after the clinic closed, it became a Red Cross center for the provision of first aid to 
evacuees. 
The Dallas Convention Center and the basketball arena and field house at 
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge served as additional sites for surge hospitals in 
the wake of Hurricane Katrina (JCAHO, 2006b). The convention center was established 
as a medical command center by physicians, students, and employees from the University 
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in preparation for evacuees. Staffed entirely by 
local medical volunteers, the facility provided urgent and chronic care and treated 
patients from hotels and other shelters, in addition to those sheltered at the Dallas 
Convention Center. Rinnert (as cited in JCAHO, 2006b), a practicing physician and 
assistant professor of emergency medicine at University of Texas, commented that using 
a space such as a convention center as a surge hospital had two major advantages—the 
space (a) could easily be segmented, as needed; and (b) was air-conditioned throughout. 
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The disadvantages were the bare appearance, harsh lighting, and lack of shower facilities. 
Overall, however, the convention center was a satisfactory setting for a surge hospital. 
The university site was deemed less satisfactory (JCAHO, 2006b). Although the 
facility attracted numerous student volunteers, as well as medical staff, the presence of 
the surge facility posed a disturbance to student life that was complicated by the concern 
over the potential for disease transmission. The primary problem was that, unlike a 
convention center or similar facility that is conducive to multiple uses, maintaining 
normal university life while providing disaster relief presented two essentially 
incompatible functions. The empty department store was the most unlikely venue for a 
surge hospital; however, the building had been purchased by Louisiana State University 
and was scheduled to be torn down in order to build new clinics for the university 
medical center. While the location made the space an excellent site for emergency 
management, medical staffing, and supply storage, the facility itself presented numerous 
logistical challenges. The largest problem was setting up communication channels in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. According to interviewees, the primary contributor to 
successful operation of the facility was the powerful spirit of volunteerism displayed by 
the workers and suppliers. 
The best setting for a surge facility in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina proved 
to be the large-animal hospital at the College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical 
Sciences at Texas A&M University (JCAHO, 2006b). The state-of-the-art facility was 
equipped for medical purposes and, after the animals were transferred and the facility 
sterilized, the site served as a shelter and specialized care center for patients with critical 
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medical needs. In a collaborative effort with St. Joseph’s Hospital, the area’s largest 
medical facility, representatives from the CDC and Prevention, the FEMA, and the 
Public-Health Service, under the direction of a physician from the Texas A&M 
University System Health Science Center and Center staff, the facility housed 650  
people and served the medical needs of more than 1,000. The effort was organized so that  
St. Joseph’s Hospital never extended beyond 80% occupancy, allowing for a high 
standard of care. 
Zane et al. (2008) examined the use of “shuttered” hospitals—specifically, closed 
or former hospitals—as surge facilities in response to a mass-casualty event. A major 
advantage of the veterinary hospital was that its infrastructure was designed for medical 
needs (JCAHO, 2006b). Zane et al. proposed the use of shuttered, or partially shuttered, 
hospitals, noting that, although some communities have contemplated such use, no 
feasibility studies had been conducted. The investigators focused on two recently closed, 
acute-care hospitals within the Boston area, selected on the basis of the following five 
key criteria: 
1. The building was safe for occupation. 
2. The former hospital had some daytime function and hence maintained its life, 
safety, and emergency building systems. 
3. The former hospital could halt its current function and be available within 3 to 
7 days of a patient surge. 




5. The site was in proximity to Boston, allowing the rapid transport of patients 
from the most concentrated population areas and the largest hospitals. 
A team of experts created a checklist for detailed evaluation of each of the 
described potential sites in terms of pertinent services; specifically, emergency medicine, 
surgery, patient-care units, nursing, food preparation, security, materials management, a 
morgue, utilities, and fire safety (Zane et al., 2008). The team was presented with two 
scenarios on which to gauge the suitability of the two facilities. In the first scenario, the 
surge facility would accommodate inpatients who were stable or had lower acute-care 
needs and who were transferred from an acute-care hospital serving high-risk patients. In 
the second scenario, the surge facility would be transformed into an isolation or 
quarantine hospital for treating patients who were victims of a biological bioterrorist act 
or of pandemic influenza or other infectious disease but who had not been admitted to an 
intensive-care unit. 
The experts participating in the Zane et al. (2008) study deemed both of the 
examined shuttered hospitals feasible sites for a surge facility but cautioned that 
responding to a mass-casualty surge would demand a considerable degree of advance 
planning and preparation. They stated that collaboration between the planners and state 
and local officials required clear delineation of the responsibility for planning the surge 
facility and initiating its operation. Zane et al. advanced that the most practical and 
efficient strategy for operating a surge hospital is likely to be a satellite facility of a large 
community hospital or tertiary medical center. In the absence of a tertiary medical center 
or hospital willing to engage in that type of arrangement, Zane et al. suggested that a 
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county health department might be a viable partner. These researchers regard staffing the 
surge hospital as the most urgent need. Bascetta (2010) noted that the state medical 
registries are designed to address the need for healthcare personnel. Zane et al. 
acknowledged that their study did not address the costs or reimbursement arrangements 
involved in opening and operating shuttered hospitals as surge facilities but added that 
this would typically be discussed among the agencies considering the endeavor. 
Resources 
Community emergency preparedness. Braun et al. (2006) considered strong 
relationships between hospitals and the community as pivotal to emergency preparedness. 
Traditionally, hospitals isolated from community networks are considered “possibly the 
weakest link in emergency responses” (p. 799). To gain insight into the degree of hospital 
integration into community planning, Braun et al. conducted a quantitative study to assess 
the links between hospitals and their respective communities, as well as the factors 
underlying the degree of hospital integration. Data were drawn from a random sample of 
575 medical-surgical hospitals. The questionnaire items were derived from a technical 
expert panel due to the lack of a predefined model or guidelines for determining factors 
relevant to understanding hospital-community relationships. 
Braun et al. (2006) assessed four dimensions of hospital integration: (a) the 
community and emergency planning process; (b) the community emergency-operations 
plan; (c) the established response capability; and (d) the ongoing processes of 
surveillance, reporting, and laboratory identification. Considerable variation was evident. 
No single professional group nor discipline was consistently entrusted with responsibility 
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for hospital preparedness, posing a challenge for community groups attempting to discern 
the appropriate hospital liaison. Many of the communities failed to capitalize on key 
stakeholders, such as volunteer organizations and local media, and some communities 
had no established communication protocols for times of crisis. The absence of 
community plans for expanding hospital-surge capacity, in terms of supplies, equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, and isolation, was not unusual. 
Braun et al. (2006) reported far more variation in preparedness among small, rural 
hospitals than in large, urban hospitals. Small facilities were comparable on performance 
measures and had a greater amount of support and assistance. Rural communities struggle 
to establish response networks and are typically in urgent need of additional government 
funding (Is the Medical Community Ready, 2010). The two measures resulting in the 
greatest degree of integration were participation in community-wide exercises and drills 
(88.2%) and undertaking threat and vulnerability analyses in collaboration with 
community responders (82.2%). 
A majority of the hospitals participating in the Braun et al. (2006) study had 
community plans addressing their potential need for additional equipment and supplies 
(57.3%), addressing decontamination-capacity issues (73%), and reflecting a direct link 
to the Health Alert Network (54.4%). The establishment of 24-hour, 7 days per week 
access to a real voice from the public-health department was the only measure resulting 
in less than one half of the participating hospitals (40%). The findings of the Braun et al. 
research made a significant contribution to the body of related existing knowledge by 
demonstrating that, while progress has been made in creating collaborative community 
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response networks, the IOM (2006) vision of a coordinated, regionalized, and 
accountable emergency-response system remains rather elusive. 
Nurses have historically played a central role in responding to health emergencies 
and disasters (Adams, 2009; Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006; Nasrabadi, Naji, Mirzabeigi, & 
Dadbahs, 2007). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, nursing and medical students were 
among the volunteers staffing surge hospitals (JCAHO, 2006b). Adams and Canclini 
(2008) described a participatory action-research project that emerged from the 
involvement of students and faculty from the Texas Christian University Harris College 
of Nursing and Health Sciences in caring for survivors of Hurricane Katrina. 
Community-health nursing students collaborated with community members to develop a 
list of priorities that would form the basis for a community disaster-preparedness health-
education program. 
Adams and Canclini (2008) envisioned the described action-research project that 
followed Hurricane Katrina as a model for future programs and applicable to a wide 
range of settings and diverse populations. These researchers advocated for collaborative 
partnerships between universities and organizations such as local Red Cross chapters, 
community emergency-response teams, and public-health departments. Teaching 
hospitals, colleges, and universities that educate health professionals are valuable partners 
within the realm of emergency-response preparedness. Graduates emerging from related 
programs are equipped with knowledge, skills, and competencies required for disaster 
preparedness. Awareness of the vital importance of emergency preparedness has led to 
the delineation of core competencies for health professionals and other hospital staff 
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responding to mass-casualty events (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006; Hsu et al., 2006; Polivka  
et al., 2008). 
Emergency resource management. Gas-pipeline failures are rare occurrences; 
however, the potential consequences of such events are devastating and include brain 
damage and loss of life (Weller, Merry, Warman, & Robinson, 2007). The incident that 
motivated a study conducted by Weller et al. (2007) was a construction accident. A 
contractor drilled through a pipeline within a hospital in New South Wales, Australia, 
setting off oxygen-failure alarms, which resulted in a rush for cylinder oxygen. The nurse 
manager was rapidly inundated with calls for oxygen from the wards, which created 
disorganized competition for oxygen cylinders between critical-care units. Although no 
patients suffered harm, the incident disclosed a number of weaknesses and raised 
awareness of the potential for damage in the event of a power failure or other crisis. 
As a prelude to the development of formal protocols, such as operating-room 
guidelines for responding to critical incidents involving technical malfunctions of 
anesthesia equipment, Weller et al. (2007) assessed the responses of 20 anesthetists to a 
simulated oxygen-failure event. The participants were informed they would be 
anesthetizing an emergency patient (i.e., a young female victim of a motor-vehicle 
accident who required 70% oxygen concentration). They could not assume that the 
operating room had already been used the same day, they would be assigned an assistant, 
and they were instructed to act as they would in a real-life situation. During the 
simulation, a whistle sounded, signifying failure of the oxygen pipeline, and the 
participants were informed by phone that damage from construction work had cut off the 
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oxygen supply to the entire hospital. The surgeon was scheduled to operate for several 
hours. After 15 minutes, a second phone call informed the participants that the damage 
had been fixed and the oxygen flow was restored. 
Following the Weller et al. (2007) simulation, questionnaires were administered 
to the participants and interviews were conducted. While noting that all of the 
participating anesthetists preserved the immediate safety of the patients, Weller et al. 
observed several key areas requiring improvement. The participants failed to conserve the 
oxygen supply, which would have serious implications in a real disaster, and used the gas 
from the repaired pipeline without a prior check for readiness. Several anesthetists were 
aware of the need to conserve oxygen but did not know specific techniques for 
effectuating its conservation. Weller et al. noted that the implications of their study go 
beyond the specifics of anesthesia management. They advocated for use of a high-
fidelity, human-patient simulator for evaluating the responses of hospital personnel to a 
vast range of critical equipment or infrastructure incidents, targeting common 
management errors, and assessing new management protocols. Such simulation exercises 
effectively identify areas requiring further education and training, with the overall goal of 
improving hospital-wide capacity to effectively respond to critical events. 
Personnel 
Credentialing volunteers. Fifteen of the 20 states sampled by Bascetta (2010) 
within a government accounting office reported building an electronic registry of medical 
volunteers. Credentialing patient care providers is a complex process that presents a 
major obstacle to the quick expansion of hospital staff (Schultz & Stratton, 2007). 
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Hospitals have the task of credentialing clinicians prior to assigning patient-care 
privileges and, especially in the case of physicians, the process can take months to 
complete. Clinicians not credentialed at a particular facility are not permitted to care for 
patients, regardless of whether they are credentialed at nearby hospitals. However, when 
a facility has a disaster plan in place and urgent care needs cannot be met, the JCAHO 
(2006a) permits a hospital to grant emergency credentialing/disaster privileges to 
individual volunteers. For physicians, the minimum requirement is a medical license and 
a photo ID, which allows permission for 72 hours of practice. This period can be 
extended, if needed, although additional information from the temporarily credentialed 
professional is typically required. 
The cumbersome credentialing process contributed to staff shortages at several 
New York hospitals following the attack of 9/11. The problem was compounded by the 
failed communication systems that precluded the hospitals from contacting sources that 
could have provided verification of the licenses of medical volunteers (Schultz & 
Stratton, 2007). Although there are federally endorsed sources of volunteers, such as the 
Medical Reserve Corps, the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, and the 
National Disaster Medical System and its attached Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, 
the standards for membership in these organizations are lower than the standards set by 
many hospitals. This results in some administrators reluctant to rely upon members. 
There are additional sources of medical volunteers; however, Schultz and Stratton (2007) 
noted drawbacks with the majority of these organizations. These researchers proposed the 
alternative of a hospital-based database of healthcare providers located within the region. 
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Each hospital currently creates its own database of physicians, nurses, behavioral-
health professionals, and technical and support staff. The majority of hospitals already 
keep this type of information; however, it is typically dispersed across different 
departments rather than maintained within a single location. To preserve privacy, the only 
information listed is what would be available in a phone directory, with no home address 
or state Web site. 
Standardized software would render a database simple, cost efficient, and 
accessible during any disaster/emergency-response situation. A disadvantage is the 
database would be limited solely to clinicians with hospital privileges and would not 
include important practitioners such as veterinarians, psychologists, and dentists. 
However, there are databases for virtually all professional groups that could be integrated 
into a hospital database such as that proposed by Schultz and Stratton (2007). Over time, 
emergency-preparedness efforts have generated many promising and innovative ideas. A 
particular advantage of the described database is that it would capitalize on the use of 
information technology for emergency-response preparedness, which is essential for 
building coordinated networks and surmounting the flawed communication that impeded 
efficient response in past disaster events. 
Psychosocial preparedness. In a disaster, the victims are not the only individuals 
to suffer psychological trauma. In the wake of a crisis, law-enforcement agents, 
firefighters, emergency medical providers, and medical and nursing staff are all subject to 
psychosocial stressors. The sources can widely vary to include exposure to tragic and 
disfiguring injuries to victims that may be friends or relatives, personal wellness 
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concerns, or worry over loved ones who may be in danger. In high-stress situations, 
maintaining the stability of skilled staff during such events, as well as in the aftermath, is 
essential to reducing the risk of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Truscott (2009) emphasized that healthcare facilities must incorporate psychosocial  
preparedness into pandemic influenza preparedness. Treating patients with infectious 
diseases carries the possible risk of care-provider infection, which the clinician could also 
transmit to his or her family. Additional concerns include ethical dilemmas involving the 
role of a healthcare provider in making difficult triage decisions between a spouse or 
parent; stigmatization resulting from possibly spreading a virus; expectations of 
maintaining a high level of care when performing unfamiliar activities; potentially 
preferential treatment in the administration of vaccines or antiviral drugs; physical 
isolation such as individual or group quarantine; escalating demands coupled with 
inadequate surge capacity; and the exposure to infection resulting in the death of patients, 
colleagues, and relatives, spurring concurrent grief and fear of personal mortality. 
Providing psychosocial support to healthcare professionals includes all of the 
components of pandemic preparedness along with measures for maintaining a supportive 
environment. Such support involves training staff in behavioral-health issues such as 
stress management; coping skills; resilience; and dealing with grief, anger, and 
exhaustion (Truscott, 2009). Both Truscott (2009) and Poutanen (2010) emphasized the 
importance of integrating self-care into pandemic preparedness. Incorporating 
nonmedical professionals into a hospital database, as recommended by Schultz and 
Stratton (2007), would ensure that hospitals have access to behavioral mental-health 
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professionals who can provide psychoeducational interventions for hospital staff dealing 
with an infectious-disease pandemic. 
Training 
Pandemic infectious-disease preparedness. Health professionals involved in 
responding to scenarios involving severe acute respiratory syndrome learned lessons they 
immediately applied when the H1N1 pandemic emerged. This knowledge was further 
honed with a subsequent Ebola outbreak and will continue to evolve as future pandemics 
introduce new data. Poutanen (2010) outlined needed components of an effective 
preparedness plan, which included a detailed communication plan; preparation for 
biosafety; preparation for a surge in laboratory testing; tracking metrics in real time; 
maintaining psychosocial support; documenting a formalized preparedness plan; ensuring 
the capacity to introduce new tests on short notice; and maximizing the use of bar codes, 
interfaces, and electronic reporting.  
As in all emergency-preparedness efforts, nurses play a pivotal role in pandemic 
preparedness. Hoffman and Nannini (2008) called for advanced-practice nurses to 
become involved in planning, surveillance, and reporting in response to pandemic 
influenza. Chan and Wong (2007) view public-health nurses as especially well-suited for 
educating community members on issues related to personal and environmental hygiene. 
They also view nurses educated in infection control as ideal trainers for other health 
professionals. 
Rust et al. (2009) noted that certain populations are disproportionately affected 
during an influenza pandemic; notably, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, individuals 
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with limited English proficiency, those with mental or physical disabilities, the uninsured, 
and all residents of underserved communities. These researchers emphasized the 
necessity for expanding surge capacity throughout the primary-care safety net in order to 
meet the needs of vulnerable populations without overwhelming hospital EDs. The 
agencies and organizations comprising this safety net include federally qualified health 
centers (e.g., community health centers, public-housing clinics, homeless health centers, 
and migrant health centers); rural health clinics; public-health outpatient clinics; local 
public-health departments; free clinics and volunteer clinics; and hospital EDs. 
Rust et al. (2009) provided several recommendations for bolstering the capability 
of the primary-care safety net to prepare for, and respond to, pandemic influenza. The 
first step is undertaking a safety needs assessment within all counties and parishes across 
the United States. Second, these researchers recommended virtual “stress tests,” utilizing 
modeling techniques to assess local safety-net capacity. Increasing such capacity and 
building safety-net organizations within communities lacking an existing safety net or 
with sufficient capacity are two essential steps. Additional steps include integrating 
primary-care safety-net providers into pandemic-influenza plans and resource allocation, 
cultivating a culturally representative health and mental-health workforce, hiring and 
training culturally and linguistically relevant healthcare workers, developing direct 
mechanisms and a logistical infrastructure for delivering pharmaceuticals and other 
resources and supplies, creating active programs and partnerships between the primary-




Public health nursing competencies. Hsu et. al. (2006) created a competency 
model for training hospital staff in emergency preparedness for application with all 
personnel. Numerous sets of emergency-preparedness competencies are described on the 
Internet, from hospital staff and public-health workers responding to bioterrorism to the 
initial stages of clinician assessment and management (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2006). Polivka 
et al. (2008) organized a Delphi panel to develop a set of disaster-preparedness 
competencies for public-health nurses expected to be on the front lines in response to a 
mass-casualty event. 
The IOM (1988) called for general public-health competencies, which were 
eventually developed and followed by other competency models such as disaster-
preparedness competencies for public-health workers and educational competencies for 
registered nurses that were related to mass-casualty events. Polivka et al. (2008) sought to 
build upon these models through a three-round Delphi study conducted by e-mail. The 
expert panel included public-health nurses, directors of nursing from local health 
departments, state nursing leaders, and national nursing-preparedness experts. 
The Polivka et al. (2008) panelists identified 25 emergency-preparedness 
competencies for public-health nurses. These competencies were categorized according 
to the three phases of emergency response—preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Preparedness competencies concentrate on personal preparedness—understanding 
disaster-preparedness terms, concepts, and roles, as well as personal familiarization with 
the disaster plan of the health department, communication equipment, and the role of the 
public-health nurse during a mass-casualty event. Response competencies center on rapid 
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needs assessment, outbreak investigation and surveillance, public-health triage, risk 
communication, and various technical skills. Recovery competencies encompass 
debriefing, engagement in disaster-plan modification, and coordinating efforts to 
effectively manage the psychosocial and public-health impact of a disaster event. 
The emergency-preparedness competencies identified by Polivka et al. (2008) are 
applicable for public-health nurses employed within any setting and offer a framework 
for structuring education and training. These researchers noted that proper education and 
training is essential to empowering public-health nurses with the requisite skills and 
competencies. A team from the Ohio Public Health Leadership Institute created a 
uniquely blended learning program based upon adult learning principles to help public- 
health nurses master identified competencies. 
Quality improvement. The realm of emergency preparedness is evolving with 
the emergence of new epidemics and a barrage of natural disasters. Lotstein et al. (2008) 
noted the widespread use of quality-improvement (QI) techniques within the healthcare 
sector, especially in the aftermath of IOM (1988) reports documenting the prevalence of 
medical errors and other compromises to safe, quality patient care. Improved safety and 
cost effectiveness are two positive outcomes resulting from the improvement of QI 
efforts. Some efforts have promoted QI within the realm of public health but with 
minimal application to the issue of PHEP. Lotstein et al. developed an innovative 
collaborative-learning tool known as Promoting Emergency Preparedness and Readiness 
for Pandemic Influenza (i.e., PREPARE for PI). 
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The Lotstein et al. (2008) pilot project was conducted with teams of three or four 
individuals sent by five state and local health departments that had demonstrated 
excellence or were interested in greater learning surrounding QI methods. The teams 
were expected to physically attend three meetings or “learning sessions” and 
subsequently undertake improvement efforts within their respective agencies (p. w330). 
The multifaceted sessions involved presentations by external experts, team planning and 
sharing activities, and discussions of QI topics and the PREPARE for PI PHEP 
framework. The framework outlines five key preparedness activities that, if effectively 
performed, work to achieve the desired outcomes of “minimized morbidity, mortality, 
and social disruption in the event of an influenza pandemic” (p. w331). The five 
preparedness activities are surveillance, case investigation, command and control, risk 
communication, and disease control and treatment. 
The Lotstein et al. (2008) QI model consists of four elements—aims and goals, 
performance measures, strategies and ideas for change, and adoption of the method and 
cycles of the quality model known as the Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA). The PDSA cycles 
are based upon the notion that the most effective path toward sustainable improvement is 
through multiple incremental and initially small changes, as opposed to the “blanket” 
implementation of a complete, predesigned program. Each team participating in the 
Lotstein et al. study chose improvement aims within the realm of operational-
performance measures aligned with the priorities of their respective agencies. The teams 
subsequently implemented process mapping, which is a basic QI tool for portraying key 
inputs, improvement targets, and desired outcomes to create personal process maps of 
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their specific goals. They were encouraged to incorporate their improvement efforts into 
the daily operations of their agencies. 
Lotstein et al. (2008) described 9 months of QI activities performed by the teams 
participating in their study. These researchers presented several examples illustrating how 
the teams applied the techniques to the areas of command and control, disease control 
and treatment, and risk communication. Within the realm of command and control, the 
Genesee County Health Department in Michigan was exemplified. Management of this 
facility sought to improve the capacity of the organization to rapidly mobilize staff in 
response to an emergency. They focused their tests on two performance measures         
(a) whether 100% of staff could respond to an alert within 90 minutes (i.e., the process 
goal); and (b) how the mode of communication affected performance. In the first e-mail 
test, only 50% of nonabsent staff responded within the specified time; 25% did not 
respond at all. Changes to the e-mail instructions produced substantial improvements— 
83% response within 90 minutes and only 5% not responding. Although the rapid 
response rate fell short of the target of 100%, the tests provided baseline data for future 
improvements and demonstrated the utility of the PDSA cycle for QI. 
The realm of disease control and treatment covers activities such as effectively 
promoting community migration, conducting rapid triage, and expanding the surge 
capacity of the respective medical system (Lotstein et al., 2008). The Georgia Division of 
Public Health devised a triage and decision-support phone line staffed by nurses for the 
purpose of advising patients who did not require face-to-face evaluation during a 
pandemic. The team effort began with forging a relationship with a local hospital to learn 
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more about its strategies for directing a triage line and creating a collaborative effort for 
its staffing. PDSA cycles focused on identifying which nurses could most effectively 
respond to callers with a wide range of symptoms by testing nurses with different 
backgrounds and exposing them to various call scenarios. Public-health nurses filling 
front-line positions proved to be the most efficient and capable. The data derived from 
the PDSA cycles presented the participating public-health department with realistic 
estimates of the staffing and resource requirements that would enable the call line to 
effectively manage a large volume of calls. Another advantage was the team successfully 
engaged the support of nurses who had initially been skeptical of the triage line. 
To illustrate application of the QI model within the realm of risk communication, 
Lotstein et al. (2008) exemplified the Baltimore City Health Department that tested the 
effectiveness of different messages and modes of communication for a back-to-school 
vaccination campaign. Parental input revealed that sending letters home with children 
was far more effective than a citywide advertising campaign. Of the total parent sample, 
63% brought their children to the vaccination clinics in response to their letters as sources 
of information, compared to only 10% who cited the ads as their source of information. 
While the health-department team acknowledged that the letter campaign might not be 
effective in some emergency situations, they learned how to gauge the effectiveness of 
communication techniques. As additional benefits, the team credited PREPARE for PI 
with helping the city achieve school-vaccination targets, improve communication with 
the public, and improve teamwork within the department. 
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PREPARE for PI is a flexible framework with a sound foundation developed from 
successful QI initiatives within various health sectors. Lotstein et al. (2008) noted a 
degree of initial skepticism from two opposite sides. On one end of the spectrum was 
public-health personnel who had never worked in emergency preparedness and were 
reluctant to do so until they observed how PREPARE for PI enabled them to improve 
high-priority areas and illuminate PHEP processes and outcomes. On the other end of the 
spectrum was emergency-preparedness personnel who initially questioned fusing 
preparedness activities with routine public-health activities. This population was 
ultimately impressed by how effectively PREPARE for PI helped team members gather 
high-priority performance data for PHEP activities. Lotstein et al. staunchly advocated 
for future efforts to synthesize QI methods into public health. Their cases studies 
indicated that the application of QI techniques is highly promising for enhancing 
emergency preparedness. 
Evaluation methods. Arboleda, Abraham, and Lubitz (2007) opined that the 
traditional checklists and questionnaires used as a basis for drawing emergency plans are 
inadequate for evaluating emergency preparedness in the case of major natural disasters 
or deliberate attacks. Both of these scenarios demand a strong internal infrastructure and 
linkages with other systems and community organizations. These researchers presented a 
dynamic simulation model for use as a tool for assessing the degree of vulnerability of a 
healthcare facility in the face of disaster. Degree of vulnerability is defined as “the impact 
created by the disaster event on the operation of the facility in comparison with normal 
operations” (p. 303). The focus is on maintaining an adequate flow of resources. The 
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model is not designed to pinpoint precise values, such as the level of patients or resources 
on a given unit, but rather, to provide trend data on the factors under examination. 
The dynamic simulation model developed by Arboleda et al. (2007) is drawn 
from an earlier model developed by Barbera and McIntyre that offers a “systematic 
approach for a community to use in developing its own medical response capability” (as 
cited in Arboleda et al., 2007, p. 303). Encompassing services and activities that are 
requisite for the care of incoming patients, the model divides the key service realms into 
three categories of prehospital care, medical care, and general emergency response. Each 
category is charted in terms of internal capabilities, external systems, types of flow, and 
participants. The systems dynamics within healthcare networks is a complex interplay 
involving health systems, clinical systems, care delivery, prevention, and epidemiology. 
The simulation model includes a number of endogenous variables (e.g., number of beds 
available on each unit, available medical staff, medication inventory, average patient 
stay, length of shift, and fatigue effects), as well as exogenous variables (e.g., patient-
arrival rates, EMS, utilities, transportation, and number of walk-ins). 
Applying the dynamic simulation model, Arboleda et al. (2007) presented a case 
analysis of a large, midwestern community teaching hospital. The scenario was the 
impact of an earthquake on the level of facility occupancy and patient flow, with damage 
sustained to the water and power supply of the city, as well as to the roads near the 
hospital, thereby diminishing these commodities and affecting the flow of patients within 
the hospital. Comparisons of the disaster scenario with another scenario in which no 
damage was sustained allowed the researchers to calculate and quantify the potential 
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effects of a disaster. The analysis focused on potential approaches to alleviating the 
resulting problems—both stock and flow related—which could be synthesized to increase 
the flow of patients during the first few hours of the disaster response. Arboleda et al. 
view the model as a potentially useful tool for aiding hospital administrators as they 
devise disaster-preparedness plans. 
Collander et al. (2008) conducted a qualitative study of hospital personnel that 
demonstrated the effectiveness of practicing for disaster situations in terms of improving 
the capability of staff members to perform well in the face of a real disaster. In reality, 
few hospitals provide adequate, if any, training for disaster events. Collander et al. noted 
the minimal evidence existing on the effectiveness of training strategies such as skills-
training sessions, field exercises, lectures, and “tabletop sessions,” as well as the lack of 
definitive guidelines for training healthcare staff in disaster preparedness. These 
researchers acknowledged that each individual training modality has strengths and 
limitations. To compensate for the drawbacks of implementing a single training method, 
a large urban hospital within Washington, DC created a multimodality program known as 
Hospital Disaster Life Support for educating and training hospital staff in disaster 
preparedness. 
Knowledge assessment. The Hospital Disaster Life Support program is based 
upon the seven core competencies for training healthcare workers in disaster training, 
which were delineated by Hsu et al. (2006). These researchers endeavored to develop an 
evidence-based competency model for training healthcare workers. They noted that the 
lack of standards and guidelines for training multidisciplinary healthcare staff represented 
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a glaring gap between the rhetoric of disaster preparedness and the actual manner in 
which such training is performed. To develop their model, Hsu et al. conducted an 
extensive literature review, analyzing the findings on existing competencies and training 
courses. They subsequently synthesized the information into a set of cross-cutting 
competencies and target objectives. They used the term cross-cutting to denote related 
but distinct groups of healthcare and hospital staff including first-receiver nurses and 
physicians, other first-receiver staff, non–first-receiver nurses and physicians, critical-
event leadership, technical staff, and administrative staff. 
A panel of 12 nationally recognized experts—drawn from hospitals, academic 
centers, professional organizations, and government agencies—convened for the 
modified Hsu et al. (2006) Delphi study. The purpose of the research was to clarify and 
refine the designated competencies and target objectives. The process yielded seven core 
competencies and 21 terminal objectives. The seven competencies are (a) recognize a 
potential critical event and implement initial action, (b) apply the principles of critical-
event management, (c) demonstrate critical-event safety principles, (d) understand the 
institutional emergency-operations plan, (e) demonstrate effective critical-event 
communications, (f) understand the incident command system and personal role within 
that system, and (g) demonstrate the knowledge and skills needed to fulfill that role 
during a critical event. Each of the core competencies was matched with a detailed set of 
terminal objectives. 
Hsu et al. (2006) advanced that an advantage of using a competency model for 
structuring disaster-response education and training is that the model details specific 
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skills and capabilities and can be flexibly adapted to the training needs of various groups 
of hospital personnel. Given the pivotal role of multidisciplinary teamwork in critical- 
event preparedness and response, Hsu et al. view a framework based upon cross-cutting 
competencies as superior to separate competencies for each population group. From a 
theoretical perspective, the competencies are derived from principles common to all 
healthcare workers. 
Prior to delivering the earlier-described program known as Hospital Disaster Life 
Support, Collander et al. (2008) conducted an online pretest to assess participant 
knowledge of hospital disaster preparedness via a survey of 23 items drawn from the Hsu 
et al. (2006) seven core competencies. The Collander et al. evaluation was based upon 10 
courses delivered over a 15-month period. The participants included 40 nurses; 11 
doctors; 23 administrators or directors; and 10 other staff members that included 
emergency medical technicians, nonclinical support staff, and protective-services staff. 
The course was arranged into the following eight units: hospital-incident command 
structure, protecting staff and facility, biological mass-casualty incident (MCI), 
conventional MCI and hospital response, radiological MCI and hospital response, 
chemical MCI and hospital response, pediatric elements of a MCI, and system restoration 
and recovery. 
The mean score at the onset of the Collander et al. (2008) study was 69.1, with no 
significant differences in scores between the various personnel groups. Upon completion 
of the course, the mean posttest score was 89.5, which indicated an impressive 
improvement. All the study groups demonstrated significant increases. The course 
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elicited favorable responses from the participants who viewed the training as relevant, 
educational, and well organized. The participants also expressed confidence in their 
ability to apply new knowledge. The weakest aspect of the training, according to the 
respondent feedback, was the simulated hospital environment. However, Collander et al. 
attributed this to a need for certain minor alterations to the original training facility, 
adding that, on the basis of the participant feedback, the course should be moved to a 
more conducive learning environment. As Hsu et al. (2006) intended, the competency 
model proved to be a valuable framework for structuring disaster-preparedness training, 
and Collander et al. created an effective, positively perceived program for hospital 
personnel. 
Bartley, Fisher, and Stella (2007) explored the effectiveness of an instructional 
video depicting footage from a disaster drill for educating medical registrars (i.e., 
residents) on a hospital disaster plan. The participating hospital is a large teaching facility 
within Victoria, Australia that had successfully combined lectures with disaster drills to 
educate senior nursing and medical staff on the disaster plan as part of a hospital-wide QI 
initiative. However, the time- and labor-intensive training was considered impractical for 
educating successive rotations of junior medical staff because their hectic schedules and 
competing demands precluded high rates of attendance. The 15-minute video, entitled 
Bombs, Bush-Fires and Big Bungles—are you Ready for the Next big one? was deemed 
to be a convenient, effective, and cost-efficient way of delivering training. Footage was 
taken from a simulated mass-casualty event created by officers of the local State 
Emergency Service. The video depicted a serious train accident after which patients were 
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triaged in the ED; given appropriate treatment; and admitted or discharged, as needed. 
All facets of disaster planning were detailed including the triage and management of 
nondisaster patients. The video was designed to provoke critical thinking among the 
viewers as to their roles in a disaster event. 
The survey used in the Bartley et al. (2007) research to evaluate senior-staff 
training was adapted for a video study. The instrument is composed of 11 questions 
assessing factual knowledge of the disaster plan and three questions assessing participant 
perceptions of their personal preparedness to play a role in the disaster plan. The survey 
questions include generic principles and international standards for disaster management, 
as well as knowledge specific to the hospital and local resources. The registrars were 
drawn from the specialties of emergency, anesthesia, intensive care, general medical, 
general surgical, and orthopedic medicine on the premise that these disciplines hold the 
greatest probability of future involvement in a disaster-management situation. A total of 
39 registrars completed the survey, which was conducted 2 weeks after they viewed the 
video. 
The instructional video shown to participants of the Bartley et al. (2007) study 
effectively boosted the factual knowledge of the sample in terms of the hospital disaster 
plan. Their response to the self-assessment questions indicated that the video successfully 
stimulated independent thinking and discussion on disaster planning. Bartley et al. noted 
that few participants earned passing scores on the pretest survey. Senior nursing and 
medical staff exhibited a low level of knowledge on the disaster plan prior to their 
training. The brevity of the video provided ease of use as an instructional tool; however, 
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Bartley et al. acknowledged the difficulty of compressing all pertinent details into the 15-
minute format. Nevertheless, the video engaged participants with limited time and the 
group-viewing format successfully prompted ideas and discussion. 
Summerhill et al. (2008) deemed it essential to incorporate biodefense and 
disaster preparedness into the educational programs of all medical specialties. These 
researchers reported that, apart from emergency medicine, few programs include training 
in these areas. Yet, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or natural disaster, patients are 
likely to present in various medical settings, not solely the ED. Concurring with Weller et 
al. (2007), Summerhill et al. view high-fidelity human simulation to be an excellent tool 
for preparing health professionals for emergency situations. Their specific focus was the 
development of a disaster-preparedness training curriculum to be integrated into internal-
medicine education. The pilot study was conducted with all 30 residents attending the 
internal-medicine residency program at the Memorial Hospital of Rhode Island and 
Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University. Ten participants from each of the 
three years of postgraduate training. A group of 30 residents from the same program who 
were never exposed to the disaster-preparedness curriculum served as a control group. 
The participants were retested 1-year post-training. 
The disaster-preparedness curriculum was composed of four 1-hour didactic 
sessions accompanied by a manual and three real-time clinical simulations (Summerhill 
et al., 2008). The lectures and manual covered the following six topics: (a) general risk 
assessment; (b) specific threats including naturally occurring infectious diseases and 
biological, chemical, and radiological attacks; (c) indications for, and proper use of, 
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personal protective equipment; (d) public-health infrastructure and reporting protocols; 
(e) the role of physicians in a public-health emergency; and (f) the psychological effects 
of disasters. For the 4-hour simulation training, Summerhill et al. (2008) developed the 
disaster-preparedness curriculum for their pilot study with scripts depicting three 
scenarios—a case of smallpox, inhalational tularemia, and exposure to the toxic chemical 
agent known as sarin.  
In all three scenarios presented by Summerhill et al. (2008), the participants were 
expected to recognize the signs and symptoms, make appropriate diagnoses, and perform 
proper procedures. Communication and teamwork skills were practiced and assessed in 
all three simulations. All the residents were active participants in one scenario and 
observed the other two simulations through a one-way mirror. All were given instructions 
and “hands-on” training on personal protective equipment and decontamination 
procedures. All the training sessions were videotaped and followed by a debriefing 
session led by a faculty member. Review of the taped sessions included constructive 
feedback and subjective appraisals. 
A total of 22 participants in the Summerhill et al. (2008) pilot study completed an 
objective test immediately following the course and 25 completed the 1-year follow-up 
test. The course participants significantly outperformed the control group on objective 
knowledge at the end of the course, with test scores of 66.8% and 50%, respectively. One 
year after the course, however, the mean score of the participants dropped to 55.7%, 
which was not significantly higher than the control group. Concurrently, the control 
group demonstrated a nonsignificant increase in knowledge based upon their 
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postgraduate year. With respect to the simulations, however, the course participants 
demonstrated significant improvements in the specific topics addressed by the course. 
They also reported improvements in their teamwork skills and their confidence in 
carrying out critical-care activities and procedures. Summerhill et al. noted that the 
residents had extremely favorable perceptions of the disaster-preparedness course. These 
researchers strongly recommended active learning strategies and high-fidelity human 
simulation for teaching disaster preparedness. 
Well-defined emergency-preparedness systems may have a significant impact on 
the success of an incident response. Standardization has long been a focus of systems 
such as the National Incident Management System, which is an approach to a 
multiagency coordinated response during a disaster. Along the same pattern, and more 
specific to hospitals, is the internationally recognized HICS, which evolved from a 
multiagency emergency-management plan known as the Incident Command System. This 
System was devised by the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies and has become widely accepted as the hallmark of hospital-incident 
management systems. Although the system has been adopted by many U.S. hospitals, 
minimal research exists on implementation and success of the model specifically. 
Schoenthal (2015) conducted a case study focused on identifying the components 
of a successful HICS implementation. Three hospitals within Palo Alto, California 
participated in the study. Schoenthal reported that the participating hospitals had a 
mature, well-practiced HICS. The article cited an average of 29.6 HICS activations per 
year over the preceding 5 years, which were reviewed to identify common factors. An 
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extensive review of the after-action reports from a major activation following the crash of 
the airliner Asiana was subsequently conducted. The success factors were compared with 
the identified factors and revealed that the presence of a fully supported system, with 
planning, training, and exercises that coordinate with those of community partners, 
supported the hypothesis. This conclusion was reached because the previously identified factors 
led to a successful response to a significant incident. 
Public Policy Expectations 
The largest challenge in expanding surge capacity is the development of altered 
standards of care. The IOM (2006) Committee on Guidance for Establishing Standards of 
Care for use in Disaster Situations was charged with the task of developing guidelines for 
assisting state and local public-health departments and healthcare organizations in 
establishing and implementing standards of care in disaster-response situations with 
scarce resources (Altevogt et al., 2009). The IOM is a branch of the National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that was commissioned by a Congressional 
Charter issued by President Lincoln in 1863. The Institute is responsible for providing the 
government, as well as the general public, with evidence by which they can base 
informed decisions on the provision of health care. The IOM emphasized that “ethical 
norms in medical care do not change during disasters—healthcare [sic] professionals are 
always obligated to provide the best care they reasonably can under given circumstances” 
(p. 2). The IOM Committee used the term crisis standards of care to denote the level of 




The IOM defined crisis standards of care as a substantial change in usual 
healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to deliver, which is made 
necessary by a pervasive or catastrophic disaster (as cited in Altevogt et al., 2009, p. 3). 
This change in the level of care delivered is justified by specific circumstances and is 
formally declared by a state government, recognizing that crisis operations will be in 
effect for a sustained period. This formal declaration allows for legal and regulatory 
oversight and protections for healthcare workers in allocating and deploying scarce 
resources and adopting alternate care-facility operations. To ensure against a compromise 
in ethical standards, the components of crisis standards of care are fairness; equitable 
processes (i.e., encompassing transparency, consistency, proportionality, and 
accountability); community and provider engagement; education; communication; and 
the rule of law (i.e., the authority to empower needed and appropriate actions and 
interventions in responding to emergencies in order to promote implementation adhering 
to laws that support the standards and create suitable incentives). The committee calls 
upon the states to devise and implement consistent crisis standards-of-care protocols 
within the state and in partnership with bordering states, as well as in collaboration with 
public- and private-sector partners. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Kingdon (2011) advanced that the structure of American political institutions 
generally works to encourage a fragmented approach toward governance. This is a 
phenomenon that is truly unique to the United States, as espoused by Kingdon. The 
healthcare industry, while not a form of national government, is unique in that it is 
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governed by certain foundational principles. The theoretical framework for the current 
study draws upon the Kingdon research to analyze the problem of deficient ED 
preparedness, arrive at solutions, and subsequently restructure the entire governance of 
hospitals to implement the solutions. The Kingdon study was therefore reviewed with a 
focus on the policy and politics surrounding the effective management of EDs and their 
ability to improve their preparedness for incidents of mass disaster. 
In the first decade of the 21st century, a succession of events, including terrorist 
attacks, natural disasters, threats of pandemic influenza, and extreme temperatures, drew 
attention to the need for improvement in healthcare emergency and disaster preparedness. 
Following a quantitative study on emergency preparedness, the IOM (2006) strongly 
criticized the public-health infrastructure on numerous related measures. These measures 
included reliance on outmoded systems, technologies, and procedures; insufficient 
training of public-health personnel; absence of real-time surveillance and epidemiological 
systems; fragmented and inefficient communication networks; inadequate domestic 
preparedness and emergency-response capabilities; and communities lacking access to 
vital public-health services (CDC & Prevention, 2008). 
The described problems escalated over time before gaining mass public attention 
due to the crises generated during the summer of 2005 by Hurricane Katrina and, 
subsequently, Hurricane Rita. The JCAHO (2006b) noted that these natural disasters 
demonstrated that preparedness at the state and local levels is critical to a successful 
response in the immediate aftermath (i.e., 12–48 hours) of such disaster scenarios. The 
ongoing need for preparedness was again emphasized by the devastation of Hurricane 
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Sandy. The potential for an influenza epidemic also prompted initiatives to expand and 
enhance the emergency-response capacity of public health, first response, and community 
agencies (Bascetta, 2010; CDC & Prevention, 2008; Hoffman & Nannini, 2008; Levy, 
2009; Phillips & Worthington, 2009; Rust et al., 2009). Epidemic preparedness returned 
to the forefront when the first Ebola patient presented within the United States and the 
country was found woefully unprepared. 
The events of terrorism and natural disasters since 2001 have increased awareness 
among the American public of these ongoing threats and the consequent need for a strong 
and cohesive emergency-health architecture (Katz & Levi, 2008). The U.S. DHS (2008) 
created a national-response framework to guide the development of a national all-hazards 
emergency-response system. Section #8 of the response framework covers public health 
and medical services. Under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, 
the states are responsible for the creation and integration of emergency-preparedness 
plans that are coordinated with regional and local jurisdictions (as cited in Bascetta, 
2010). The secretary of the U.S. DHHS is the lead official for all public-health and 
medical emergency-response efforts, and the U.S. DHS and U.S. DHHS are charged with 
joint responsibility for supporting these efforts. Further assistance is to be provided by the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs including coordination 
between civilian and military hospitals in response to a mass emergency. 
Despite elaborate policy plans, a clear dichotomy exists between federal mandates 
for community disaster/emergency preparedness and federal funding for such efforts at 
the national, regional, and local levels (Cherry & Trainer, 2008). Hospitals vary 
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considerably in the extent they are prepared to handle emergency situations (Braun et al., 
2006). In general, urban hospitals (i.e., those with prior disaster-management experience) 
have a greater degree of preparedness. Rural hospitals suffer from staff and resource 
shortages, and small and midsized hospitals often have no specific emergency-
management personnel or related budgets in place (Is the Medical Community Ready, 
2010). Exacerbating the problem, many rural areas do not have county police, fire, nor 
EMS and are thus highly dependent upon volunteers to carry out emergency-response 
activities. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (as cited in Bascetta, 2010) 
determined that, to respond to a mass-casualty event, healthcare systems need surge 
capability (i.e., the ability to provide adequate care for large numbers of patients with 
atypical or uniquely specialized medical needs). The provision of this type of care 
demands scarce resources and is administered in venues such as surge hospitals or other 
conventional medical settings. After conducting literature reviews and interviews with 
experts and professional associations, investigators of the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office targeted the following four essential components of emergency 
preparedness in the face of a mass-casualty event (as cited in Bascetta, 2010): 
1. Expanding hospital capacity including beds, workforce, supplies, and 
equipment. 
2. Locating and operating alternate sites for the provision of medical care. 
3. Registering and credentialing volunteer medical professionals. 
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4. Planning alternate standards of care with the goal of saving as many lives as 
possible. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (as cited in Bascetta, 2010) 
investigated the extent of emergency preparedness within 20 states and found that most 
of the states demonstrated substantial progress on the first three essential components of 
emergency preparedness; however, only seven states had any plans in place for alternate 
standards of care in the event of mass casualties. All 20 states were in the process of 
establishing bed-reporting systems and most were working with military and Veterans 
Administration hospitals to extend hospital capacity. Eighteen of the states were locating 
alternate care facilities and 15 were creating registries of medical volunteers. State 
officials disclosed a number of challenges involved in addressing the four components of 
emergency preparedness. In this current literature review, I examine issues related to 
expanding hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. The review is presented in a 
manner that corresponds with the Kingdon (2011) theory of policy development, which 
consists of three independent streams—problems, politics, and policy. Related problems 
are outlined with an initial historical background of hospital emergency preparedness and 
subsequent discussion regarding the state of emergency medicine and ED overcrowding. 
The Kingdon (2011) theory contends that the policy process moves in phases. 
Progression moves from the initial focus on the problems to the political stream. This is 
the process where the potential policy is defined as a worthy target for improvement or 
resolution. In the case of emergency-preparedness policy, this process tends to follow an 
event or disaster, with progression to decision-making processes where various ideas and 
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possible problem resolutions are explored and tested for viability. Recommendations are 
discussed within various forums and accepted or rejected based upon anticipated 
stakeholder response. At any point in the process, a potential policy may stall for 
numerous reasons such as funding, competing priorities, or loss of interest. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Traditional emergency-response protocols are focused on the capacity of 
individual hospitals. Recognition of the need for a comprehensive, nationwide 
emergency-response system grew during the 1990s. However, it was not until a 
succession of natural and intentional mass-casualty events—most notably, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina—that efforts to create an emergency-response 
infrastructure with federal support for state, regional, and local initiatives were generated 
(Bascetta., 2010; Toner et al., 2009). The ACEP (2006, 2009) revealed tremendous 
variation in the emergency preparedness of independent states, and the United States 
overall barely earned a passing grade. Hospital data drawn by the AHA (2010) indicate 
that the EDs of approximately one half of all urban hospitals are strained to capacity. 
Concurrently, large urban hospitals are better prepared than small, rural medical facilities 
for surge capacity (Braun et al., 2006). A series of reports show wide variation in 
preparedness, regardless of whether the unit of analysis is the individual hospital or the 
community, region, or state (ACEP, 2006, 2009). 
The prevalence of Delphi studies by researchers who called upon expert panels to 
identify competencies for emergency preparedness or devise relevant questionnaire items 
highlight the relative novelty of the topic of disaster/emergency preparedness. The ACEP 
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(2009) contributed to this volume of research. Innovative approaches were explored such 
as the use of simulation (Arboleda et al., 2007; Summerhill et al., 2008); using shuttered 
hospitals as surge facilities (Zane et al., 2008); and the development of a risk 
classification for early patient discharge from hospitals (Kelen et al., 2006). Despite these 
research efforts, significant gaps exist between the rhetoric of emergency preparedness 
and the extent to which healthcare facilities and state and community agencies are 
actually prepared for a disaster event. 
Katz and Levi (2008) argued that emergency preparedness should be an integral 
element of the discourse on healthcare reform. In this intense and heated debate, 
emergency preparedness has been eclipsed by issues to which the public have an 
emotional attachment such as costs, insurance, and Medicare ironically, the same issues 
that dominated health care when Kingdon (1995) conducted his original study. It is 
possible that the policy window for moving emergency preparedness to the forefront has 
closed with the lapse of time since Hurricane Katrina. On the other hand, emergency 
preparedness spans two important issues—healthcare reform and national security  which 
provides leverage to supporters working to generate attention and action. The design of 
the current study is described along with the research methodology. The origin and 
characteristics of the data-collection tool are provided. As is the rationale behind the 
study population and sample size. The planned methods for collecting, organizing, and 
analyzing data are described.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methods applied in the research. The study 
design, instrumentation, target and sample population, sampling procedures, and data-
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collection and data-analysis procedures are described in detail. The data collected are 
analyzed with the goal of providing a clearer understanding of the requirements and 
current state of hospital-emergency preparedness, as well as to increase recognition of the 
challenges encountered by U.S. hospitals as they work to sustain preparedness.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Overview 
The purpose of the current quantitative research was to examine the gap between 
effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of 
healthcare providers. Toward this end, I examined emergency-preparedness policy, 
expectations, and availability; the adequacy of facilities and resources including 
education and training; and perceptions of emergency risk. The hypotheses formed for 
each of the three research questions assisted in explaining whether regional hospitals, 
such as the acute-care institutions within the state of Tennessee, meet the requirements or 
standards of emergency preparedness. The findings revealed how widely such 
preparedness varies among hospitals, as does the level of core-provider awareness of 
expectations surrounding emergency preparedness. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following research questions and corresponding hypotheses guided this 
study: 
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
Null Hypothesis 1 states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are 
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1 
states that hospital EDs within the state of Tennessee are prepared to manage 
mass disaster incidents. 
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2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
Null Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient 
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related public-
policy expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 states that first-line ED 
managers possess sufficient knowledge and awareness of emergency 
preparedness and related public-policy expectations. 
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
Null Hypothesis 3 states that first-line ED care providers do not have positive 
perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their 
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 states that first-
line ED care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources, 
capabilities, and training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster. 
The research questions were answered using a quantitative approach. Quantitative 
methodology was the most beneficial for this study because the data compared were 
finite and represented information and specific factors related to emergency preparedness 
including, but not limited to, the understanding of requirements, resource availability, and 
training adequacy. A published questionnaire was used as the foundation for creating the 
survey tool. The instrument facilitated access to quantitative data related to the actual 
preparedness and awareness of the national response framework. Additional closed-ended 
questions resulted in a clearer understanding of the perceptions 
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of care providers in terms of emergency preparedness (see Appendix A). 
The dependent variable in the current study was emergency preparedness. The 
first independent variables comprised the problems stream in relation to the application of 
Kingdon’s theoretical framework (2003) and refer to resources, training, infrastructure, 
and budget, as well as recent mass-casualty events. The second independent variable was 
the policy stream, which relates to knowledge of federal policy, state, and local policy; 
the development of hospital policy; and the availability of disaster plans. The third 
independent variable was the politics stream, which refers to media relations, notable 
leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events. Another independent variable was 
hospital location, in terms of urban, suburban, or rural, in order to further define the 
participating medical facilities. The research was cross-cultural in nature through the 
selection of multiple hospitals within various geographical areas. 
Research Design and Rationale 
As noted earlier, the approach for this study was based upon a quantitative model. A 
cross-sectional, nonexperimental research design facilitated the examination of 
emergency preparedness within multiple acute-care hospitals across the state of 
Tennessee. This design is a snapshot of outcome and response as well as of exposed 
predictor variables among a population. Data collection was effectuated via an online 
questionnaire using industry-recognized technology. The survey instrument was 
composed of 73 closed-ended questions intended to gather data on variables pertaining to 
emergency preparedness. Emergency preparedness, as the outcome, was assessed at 
different levels of exposure, including perception, training, education, resources, and 
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facilities (see Appendix A). This design was efficient, given that follow-up is 
unnecessary in the assessment and causality was not assumed (see Holmes, 2009). 
The primary components of quantitative research provide a focused perspective 
related to each theme at the foundation of the respective study. In the current research, 
the data collected reflected the means by which participants perceived certain actions of, 
and attitudes toward, hospital preparedness. A cross-sectional design, also termed survey 
design, is commonly used in behavioral-sciences study when data are collected at a single 
point in time from a representative subset of a larger population (Babbie, 2007; Fowler, 
2009). A survey method is effective in describing and establishing a relationship between 
the variables at the time a survey is administered (Babbie, 2007). 
The benefit of using a cross-sectional design is that it allows the development of 
pertinent information without a prolonged collection period. This was the aim in the 
current study, accomplished by establishing a relationship between awareness of 
preparedness expectations, actual levels of preparedness, and provider perceptions. With 
this goal, a cross-sectional design with a self-administered online survey was indicated. 
Self-administered surveys are now commonly completed online because they generally 
result in an increased rate of participation due to the decreased burden of time placed 
upon respondents. Cost is a primary consideration and online surveys minimize 
researcher expense while increasing the likelihood of a sufficient rate of participation. 
Generalization of the results in this study to the targeted population, namely, EDs 
in the United States, was a consideration. Validity was established with a homogeneous 
group. The characteristics of the expected study group in this research (i.e., ED managers 
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within hospitals across the state of Tennessee) vary little from ED managers within other 
regions of the United States. Knowledge, response capabilities, and ED operations run 
parallel. 
Setting and Sample 
Criteria for participation in the current study included affiliation with an acute-
care hospital. This description fit approximately 4,000 hospitals within the United States 
(ACEP, 2002), which would have resulted in a prohibitive sample size due to time and 
cost restrictions. Consequently, and to avoid a sampling error, the sample frame for the 
study was a representative subset of the target population, which consisted of ED 
managers of all acute-care hospitals within the state of Tennessee (see McNabb, 2002). A 
list of potential hospital participants was derived from the Tennessee Hospital Guide 
(2016). As noted earlier, participants were employed as hospital ED managers or 
directors for a minimum of 1 year at the onset of the study and had a fluent command of 
the English language. ED managers of all acute-care hospitals within the state of 
Tennessee were asked to participate in the research. 
A questionnaire was e-mailed to potential participants, which tends to have a 
lower response rate than surveys administered on a one-on-one basis (see McNabb, 
2002). Due to the statistically poor response rate, the targeted sample size for this study 
was adjusted for a 25% attrition rate, implying a response rate of 75%. By adjusting for 
this attrition, the response rate was expected to provide adequate power to support the 
needed rigor. With a sufficient sample size, the data were expected to reveal common 
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themes, enabling me to either prove or disprove the study hypotheses (see Leedy & 
Ormond, 2010). 
Determining the appropriate sample sizes and power estimations for survey 
studies with cross-sectional, nonexperimental research designs presents many challenges, 
particularly when the condition is very rare or is influenced by geographic clustering. 
Estimates of sample size with prevalence or cross-sectional studies is a function of 
expected prevalence and precision for a given level of confidence, which is indicated by 
the z statistic. Consequently, selection of the appropriate values for these variables is not 
always straightforward, but rather, based upon assumptions including effect size (i.e., 
delta), standard deviation, statistical power, and Type I error tolerance as sampling 
variability (i.e., random error). 
With a simple linear regression model in testing the hypotheses on disaster 
preparedness and problems, policy, and politics, the following parameters were used: (a) 
Type I error tolerance of 1% (99% confidence interval [CI]), rejecting a true null 
hypothesis; (b) statistical power of 80.7% (1-beta)—the Type II error tolerance—
implying failure to reject a true null hypothesis; and (c) effect size of 0.2% (20%; sample 
size of 42). To determine the adequate sample size in assessing the difference in the t 
value and F variance in the multiple regression model, the following parameters were 
used: (a) Type I error tolerance of 1% (99% CI), rejecting a true null hypothesis; (b) 
statistical power of 80% (1-beta)—the Type II error tolerance—implying the failure to 
reject a true null hypothesis; and (c) effect size of 0.2 (20%; a sample size of 59). 
Situations exist wherein these assumptions are not met, presenting specific challenges 
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with respect to external validity or generalizability of the study findings. These situations 
include, but are not limited to, smaller population sizes in relation to the sample sizes, 
sampling technique, or missing data. In this research, the estimated sample size was 
based upon the study hypotheses derived from the research questions. 
Research Question 1 was as follows: How do perceptions of resource, training, 
and budgetary problems relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
Tennessee? Null Hypothesis 1 stated that hospital EDs within the State of Tennessee are 
not prepared to manage mass disaster incidents. Alternative Hypothesis 1 stated that 
hospital EDs within the State of Tennessee are prepared to manage mass disaster 
incidents. 
To determine adequate sample size, the hypotheses correlating to Research 
Question 1 were tested, and the effect size was 0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%, 
and Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which collectively imply 80% power. With these 
parameters, coupled with a response rate of 75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse 
rate), the sample size to determine a statistically significant difference in knowledge 
surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge existed among the respondents, 
was 108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a delta of 0.2 (20%) with the 
same attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to determine the difference in 
knowledge of disaster preparedness among the study sample of the study, with a Wald 
Test comparing one proportion to a reference value, was 59 participants (see Figure 2). 
Research Question 2 was as follows: How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital 
policy and plans relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
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Tennessee? Null Hypothesis 2 stated that first-line ED managers do not possess sufficient 
knowledge and awareness of emergency preparedness and related public-policy 
expectations. Alternative Hypothesis 2 stated that first-line ED managers possess 
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Performing iteration  
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 Wald z test 
 H0: p = p0 versus Ha: p! = p0 
Study parameters: 
        alpha = .0500 
        power = 0.8000 
        delta = 0.1500 
         p0 = 0.5000 
         pa = 0.6500 
Estimated sample size: 
            N = 86 
Disp 0.25*86  
 21.5 
Figure 1. Illustration of sample-size estimation. Estimate found by comparing one 
proportion to the reference value found with a Wald test (i.e., effect size: δ = 0.15). While 
the estimated sample size utilized individual ID effect size of 0.15, the multivariable 





Estimated sample size for a one-sample proportion test 
Wald z test 
H0: p = p0 versus Ha: p!= p0 
Study parameters: 
        alpha = .0500 
        power = 0.8000 
        delta = 0.2000 
           p0 = 0.5000 
           pa = 0.7000 
Estimated sample size: 
            N = 47 
Disp 0.25*47 
11.75 
Figure 2. Illustration of sample-size estimation. The sample size estimation is illustrated 
by comparing one proportion to the reference value found with a Wald test (i.e., effect 




To determine adequate sample size, the independent variables, namely problem, 
policy, and politics related to disaster/emergency preparedness and the dependent 
variable mainly disaster and emergency preparedness were assessed the effect size was 
0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%, and Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which 
collectively imply 80% power. With these parameters, coupled with a response rate of 
75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse rate), the sample size to determine a statistically 
significant difference in knowledge surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge 
existed among the respondents, is 108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a 
delta of 0.15 (15%) with the same attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to 
determine the difference in knowledge of disaster preparedness among the study sample 
of the proposed research, with a Wald Test comparing one proportion to a reference 
value, was 59 participants (see Figure 2). Since the overall assessment involved multiple 
in the multivariable linear regression model with the three IVs, the attrition rate 
compensation of 12 participants was applied to the sample size, implying n=47+12=59.  
Research Question 3 asked, “How do perceptions of external and internal 
organizational politics relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
Tennessee?” Null Hypothesis 3 stated that first-line ED care providers do not have 
positive perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and training within their 
hospitals to manage a mass disaster. Alternative Hypothesis 3 stated that first-line ED 
care providers have positive perceptions of the available resources, capabilities, and 
training within their hospitals to manage a mass disaster. 
 To determine adequate sample size, the hypotheses correlating to Research 
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Question 3 were tested; the effect size was 0.2 (20%), Type I error tolerance was 1%, and 
Type II error tolerance was 0.20, which collectively imply 80% power. With these 
parameters, coupled with a response rate of 75% (i.e., a 25% attrition or nonresponse 
rate), the sample size to determine a statistically significant difference in knowledge 
surrounding disaster preparedness, if such knowledge exists among the respondents, is 
108 participants (see Figure 1). However, assuming a delta of 0.15 (15%) with the same 
attrition rate (25%), the sample size required to determine the difference in knowledge of 
disaster preparedness among the study sample of the proposed research, with a Wald Test 
comparing one proportion to a reference value, is 59 participants (see Figure 2). 
Instrumentation 
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey administered in the 
current study was adapted to fit the particular scope of the research. Permission was 
granted directly from the author of the original tool (Kaji, Langford, & Lewis, 2008; see 
Appendix B). Survey items related to perceptions of emergency preparedness were 
pretested following development. The instrument is composed of 73 questions, each of 
which was formulated to correlate with a research question and presented with a Likert-
type scale allowing respondents to select their nearest answers (see Table 1 & Appendix 
A). An estimated 66% of the questions in the original survey had been validated. Items 
related to perception were developed to complement prevalidated questions on other 
aspects of the survey. The majority of the variables in the current study will be measured 




 Upon acceptance of the proposal for this study and permission from the Walden 
University Dissertation Committee, an e-mail was sent to introduce me as the researcher 
to the primary contacts within the selected hospitals. These contacts are the Chief  
Nursing Officers of the organizations. The e-mail included a request that the surveys and 
related survey participation information be forwarded to all ED nurse managers or ED 
nurse leaders within their organizations. The list of acute-care hospitals was obtained 
from the Tennessee Hospital Guide (2016). The cover letter of the e-mailed packet also 
described the purpose of the study, estimated time to complete study (30-minutes), and a 
consent form was included. A link was provided to the online survey.  
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Table 1  
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Politics stream  
(Kingdon, 2011) 
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Mailed surveys can result in a particularly low response rate (Dillman, Smyth, & 
Christian, 2009). In this study, to increase the rate of response, a strategic set of 
reminders were distributed. Three weeks following the initial e-mail, a second 
distribution of the survey was sent to the primary contacts expressing thanks for those 
who had already submitted the surveys and requesting completion from those yet to 
submit the instrument. This second mailing included a brief, friendly cover letter again 
requesting participation and return of the survey and repeating the link to the online 
survey. The data-collection phase of the study was terminated 2 weeks following this 
second mailing. 
In the preliminary questionnaire, Survey Questions 18, 29, 30, 36, 47, and 48 
addressed the dependent variable of disaster preparedness. The independent variables of 
problems, policy, and politics were also represented within the survey questions. 
Questions 45, 55, 56, 64, and 65 relate to the independent variable of problems. 
Questions 19, 60, 63, and 26 relate to the independent variable of policy, while Survey 
Questions 26, 50, and 62 address the independent variable of politics.  
To control for potential discrete or categorical variable, this model was 
applicable: Disaster preparedness = Constant (β0)   + β1 (problem) + β2 (policy) + 
β3(politics) + β4 (sex) + β5(age) + β6(education) + β7 (Healthcare system location) + error. 
However, if the main independent variable remained insignificant, it was not included in 
the final model as applicable to problem related to disaster and emergency preparedness 




The primary purpose of the statistical analysis is to quantify variation in the 
research data, which may derive from a natural phenomenon (i.e., biologic and social 
variability) or measurement or observation error. This process commences with 
descriptive statistics, termed exploratory analysis or summary statistics, and terminates 
with inferential statistics, implying estimation, a Confidence Interval (CI) method, and 
hypothesis testing. The basic rationale for hypothesis testing with either a critical or p 
value method is to generalize the findings from the sample data (i.e., statistics) to the 
target population (i.e., the parameter). In effect, the inferential statistics with hypothesis 
testing utilizes the null and alternative hypotheses in the process of inference. The p value 
is used as evidence against the null hypothesis, given the preset Type I error tolerance 
level, usually .05 (5%) in univariable mode, or the Bonferroni method for multiple 
comparison, as well as a .01 (1%) Type 1 error tolerance multivariable analysis or model 
(Holmes & Opara, 2014; McNabb, 2002). 
Descriptive Statistics 
The survey responses in this research were analyzed with a qualitative scale of 
response measurement, implying dichotomous questions for gender (A = Male, B = 
Female), and categorical questions for age-group (A = 21–30, B = 31–40, C = 41–50, D = 
51–60, E = 61–70). Additionally, a Likert/ordinal scale (A = strongly disagree, B = 
disagree, C = neutral, D = agree, E = strongly agree) and a binary scale (A = yes, B = no) 
was used to measure knowledge of organizational policy and disaster preparedness. 
Because none of the variables in the survey instrument were measured on a quantitative 
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scale, the data in this study do not assume the shape and dispersion in the probability 
distribution. Consequently, frequency and percentages as proportion were used to 
describe or summarize the data (Holmes & Opara, 2014). With this exploratory analysis, 
the inferential statistics that fit these data did not assume normality or equality of 
variance, as required in parametric testing, but will be based on z distribution (i.e., test of 
proportion), as an approximation of a standard normal curve (i.e., the standardized 
normal). 
Inferential Statistics 
Hypothesis testing. There is no assumption of linearity or linear relationship 
between the response and independent variables of this study. The relationship, 
independence, or association between the intendent and response variables were 
examined using the chi-square statistic, comparing the observed to the expected 
frequency counts or coefficient matrix that assumes linearity and normality, depending 
upon the test. 
Correlation coefficient and chi-square. The correlation-coefficient analysis was 
used to assess the relationship between the independent variable statistics (McNabb, 
2002). Because there was no normality assumption, the Spearman correlation-coefficient 
analysis, which is a nonparametric model, was used. This analysis generates the 
correlation-covariance matrix for the Spearman Rho and the significance level, adjusting 
multiple comparisons with the Bonferroni correction (Holmes & Opara, 2014). 
The Spearman correlation coefficient is comparable to the parametric model of 
Pearson, where the null hypothesis is the correlation coefficient r = 0.0, implying there is 
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no correlation between the independent and dependent variables in the coefficient matrix. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if p is < .05, implying strong evidence against this 
hypothesis. A correlation of 0.1–0.3, 0.4–0.7, and 0.8–1.0 is indicative of a direct and 
positive mild, moderate, and strong correlation, respectively. A moderate correlation such 
as 0.5 is indicative of collinearity and suggests removal of such independent variables 
from the model for regression (Field, 2009). 
Chi-square statistics, although not necessarily required, are used to examine the 
association or independence between the dependent and independent variables in the 
described context, and validation was performed through Spearman correlation-
coefficient analysis. The chi-square model generates the chi-square value, the degree of 
freedom, and the probability value for statistically significant independence. Relative to 
the Spearman correlation coefficient, the higher the chi-square value, the lower the p 
value and likelihood of a statistically significant independence (Holmes & Opara, 2014). 
Linear regression (simple and multiple) model. A linear regression model was 
used to examine the relationship or association between disaster/emergency preparedness 
as a dependent variable (Y), policy expectations (x1), knowledge of disaster-management 
policy and plans (x2), organizational policy (x3), and major adverse/traumatic events 
(x4).  Simply, these models assessed whether or not problem related to emergency or 
disaster preparedness, policy and politics could be used to predict disaster or emergency 
preparedness in a healthcare system setting. These models are adequate given that the 
dependent variable of disaster preparedness is measured on a continuous scale while the 
independent variables are measured on mixed scales; namely, continuous ordinal, binary, 
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dichotomous, and categorical (Holmes & Opara, 2014). The linear regression for disaster 
preparedness is β0 + β1(problem) + β2(policy) + β3(politics). 
The aim of applying this multivariable model was to allow simultaneous 
examination of the four predictor variables, controlling for age, gender, ED-manager 
experience, type of hospital (i.e., private or public), and geographic locale (i.e., county, 
city, rural, urban, or metropolitan; Babbie, 2007). This allowed for an adjusted 
association through noncausal assessment (i.e., cross-sectional design) of the state of 
emergency preparedness within EDs across Tennessee. Therefore, due to the potential for 
confounding, the final model is Disaster Preparedness = β0 + β1(Problem) + β2(policy) + 
β3(Politics) + (confounding variables). Where β0 is the constant, the intercept on the y 
axis and β1, β2, and β3 are the slopes representing problem, policy, and politics, 
respectively. These are the functions or exposure effects of disaster preparedness and 
balance or control for age, gender, and geographic locale (urban vs. rural). Since problem 
related to disaster preparedness as a predictor of disaster preparedness was not significant 
at the multivariable level analysis without confounding, this variable was excluded as a 
predictor of disaster preparedness in the final model that adjusted for the potential 
cofounding.  
Confidence level. All tests were two-tailed with .05 (5%) as the significance level 
for univariable models or analyses. A 99% CI was used for the controlled or adjusted 
model (i.e., multivariable). STATA statistical software, Version 15.0, was employed for 
the entire analysis. 
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Validity and Reliability 
 Babbie (2007) contended that Web-based surveys have statistically significant 
results that are congruous with other survey methods. No unique challenges or limitations 
emerged in this current study to argue against this point. As noted earlier, the Disaster 
Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey is a modified version of the Disaster 
Preparedness Survey developed by Kaji et al. (2008). With permission, the Kaji et al. 
instrument was modified by adding questions designed to gain respondent perspectives 
on the level of preparedness within their respective hospitals, as well as their awareness 
of public-policy expectations related to emergency preparedness (see Appendix B). The 
content of the original Kaji et al. survey items was minimally altered to fit Likert-type 
ranking and eliminate regionally specific terminology. 
The target population of the current research runs parallel to that of the Kaji et al. 
study group. The majority of questions within the modified instrument relate to actuality 
or facts that were readily available to respondents within a clinical setting. Questions 
related to perceptions were presented with a Likert-type response scale. The consistency 
of questions within the survey instrument was measured via a Cronbach’s-alpha test, 
which has been discussed in detail. 
Ethical Procedures 
The current research was conducted with strict observance to requirements of the 
Walden University Institutional Review Board. The approval number for this study is 01-
02-18-0110078, which expires December 31, 2019. The ED nurse managers of all acute-
care hospitals across the state of Tennessee were invited by e-mail to participate in the 
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study. The message included my contact information as the researcher and that of the 
dissertation chair and the Walden University Institutional Review Board. Survey 
participation was strictly voluntary. There was no disclosure risk of participant 
identification, which was assured within the recruitment letter. No individuals nor 
agencies involved in the study were identified. All precautions were taken to conduct the 
research in a moral and ethical manner, which included anonymity of all participants and 
their employing institutions. Any hard copies of the completed study surveys will be 
maintained for 5 years following publication of the research within a locked, fireproof 
box in my home. Upon conclusion of the 5-year period, the instruments will be destroyed 
by shredding or incineration. 
Summary 
The research design for this study has been described in detail, which is cross-
sectional and nonexperimental in nature. The purpose of the research was to examine the 
gap between effective hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and 
perceptions of healthcare providers. A comprehensive, pretested, and piloted 
questionnaire facilitated data collection related to expectations (i.e., resources/facilities, 
education/training, and policy) and perceptions of risk. A quantitative method involving 
hypothesis testing was applied in the examination of emergency preparedness with 
respect to existing policy and its implementation, resources and facilities, education and 




Chapter 4: Results 
Overview 
Researchers have suggested that disaster preparedness is a critical component to 
the ability of hospitals to successfully provide the safety net expected by the general 
public (Bechtel et al., 2004; Braun et al., 2006; Cherry & Trainer, 2008; Nissa & 
Shimizu, 2011). Hospitals, and particularly EDs, are expected to be at a constant state of 
readiness 24/7 to render care to victims of any type of hazard. Using commonly identified 
tenets of preparedness, I examined awareness of emergency-preparedness policy; 
expectations and availability; the adequacy of facilities, resources, education, and 
training; and perceptions of emergency risk. I explored these factors through quantitative 
measurement to gain knowledge surrounding the disaster preparedness of a sample 
representing ED nurse leaders (i.e., directors and managers) within the State of 
Tennessee. The purpose of this study was to examine the gap between effective hospital 
emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare 
providers. 
Data were collected from ED nurse leaders to determine their awareness of 
disaster-preparedness expectations, levels of preparedness, and perceptions of 
preparedness. The following research questions guided this study: 
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
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3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Survey facilitated collection of data appropriate 
to answering the research questions. 
The study survey was a web-based, self-administered tool. The instrument was 
employed to measure emergency preparedness, which was the dependent variable of this 
research. The first independent variables comprised the problems stream (i.e., resources, 
training, infrastructure, and budget), as well as recent mass-casualty events. Policy stream 
was the second independent variable and related to knowledge of federal policy as well as 
state and local development of hospital policy and the availability of disaster plans. The 
third independent variable was the politics stream, which addressed media relations, 
notable leadership actions, and recent mass-casualty events. Another independent 
variable was hospital location in terms of urban, suburban, or rural, which added another 
factor potentially influencing disaster preparedness. 
The Disaster Preparedness: Acute Care Hospital Survey is a slightly modified 
version of the Disaster Preparedness Survey developed by Kaji et al. (2008) for Johns 
Hopkins under contract with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The author 
of the Disaster Preparedness Survey granted me permission to use the survey tool in this 
current study. The tool had been previously tested for reliability and was noted to have a 
high degree of internal reliability. Variability in the interrater reliability was also noted. 
Items related to perception were developed to complement the prevalidated questions on 
other aspects of the survey. Study participants were asked to answer questions pertaining 
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to their awareness of policy expectations for disaster preparedness as well as their 
perceptions on the level of preparedness they perceived within their organizations. 
 Data Demographics 
The reported data reflect the survey results on hospital and overall healthcare-
system disaster/emergency problems, as well as the policy and politics related to 
disaster/emergency preparedness within the state of Tennessee. The findings depict the 
study characteristics such as participant demographics; features of the healthcare or 
hospital system, including geographic locale; construct validity (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha); 
the correlation coefficient; the simple linear prediction of disaster/emergency 
preparedness, given (a) the problems, (b) the policy, and (c) politics; and the 
multivariable prediction of disaster/emergency preparedness, adjusting for gender, age, 
education, and geographic locale of the healthcare or hospital system, as well as public-
policy cognizance. Table 1 displays the characteristics of the survey participants, which 
concurrently portray a cross-sectional nonexperimental, epidemiologic study design 
aimed at assessing the predictive effects of disaster/emergency problems, policy, and 
politics, as they relate to disaster preparedness within the hospitals and overall healthcare 
systems of the state of Tennessee. The table specifically reports participant gender, age, 
education, disaster-preparedness experience, geographic locale (i.e., urban vs. rural), and 
access to disaster-preparedness resources. 
Table 2 demonstrates the frequency and percentages of study participants by 
sociodemographic, namely, education, age, and gender. The overall sample is comprised 
of 51 participants, 27.4% of whom are male (n = 14, 95% CI, 16.7–41.7) and 72.5% of 
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whom are female (n = 51, 95% CI, 58.3–83.3). The age group distribution of the 
participants indicated the lowest frequencies for both the youngest respondents (21–30 
years, n = 3, 5.9%) and the oldest (61–70 years, n = 6, 11.8%). The highest frequency 
was observed in the age group of 41 to 50 (n = 15, 29.4%, 95% CI, 18.3–43.7), followed 
by the 31 to 40 age group (n = 14, 27.4%, 95% CI, 16.7–41.7). The highest frequency of 
participants was found to be among those with a bachelor’s degree (n = 24, 47.1%, 95% 
CI, 33.56–61.1), followed by a master’s degree (n = 21, 41.2%, 95% CI, 28.2–55.5). The 
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Academic degree    
 Associate 4 7.8 2.9–19.7 
 Bachelor’s 24 47.1 33.5–61.1 
 Master’s 21 41.2 28.2–55.5 
 Doctorate 2 3.9 0.9–15.0 
    
Age-group    
 21–30 3 5.9 1.8–17.3 
 31–40 14 27.4 16.7–41.7 
 41–50 15 29.4 18.2–43.7 
 51–60 13 25.5 15.1–39.6 
 ˃ 60 6 11.8 5.2–15.0 
    
Gender    
 Male 14 27.5 16.7–41.7 
 Female 37 72.5 58.3–83.3 
Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence 
limits. CI = confidence interval. 
Disaster Preparedness Training 
With respect to knowledge of public policy related to emergency preparedness, an 
estimated 27 participants reported awareness (52.9%, 95% CI, 38.9–66.5). Table 3 
presents the distribution of survey respondents by training, drill-practice frequency, and 
disaster-response participation. With regard to specific training in emergency 
preparedness, an estimated 38 participants reported acquiring such training from their 
affiliated institutions (74.5%, 95% CI, 61.6–84.9). Concerning drill or practice exercise 
with multiagency frequency, 31 respondents reported such participation on an annual 
basis (60.8%, 95% CI, 46.4–73.5). However, 12 respondents reported never participating 
in such drills (23.5%, 95% CI, 13.6–37.5). With respect to disaster-response 
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participation, 30 respondents reported such involvement (58.8%, 95% CI, 44.5–71.8), 
while 20 indicated no experience with disaster response (39.2%, 95% CI, 26.5–53.6). 
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Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence 
limits. CI = confidence interval. 
Resources 
Table 4 illustrates the survey results related to healthcare systems and hospital 
resources for disaster preparedness. Regarding the employment of an in-house radiation 
safety officer available during a radiological event, 18 participants affirmed the existence 
of this position within their affiliated institutions (35.3%, 95% CI, 23.1–49.7), while 23 
reported no such position (45.1%, 95% CI, 31.2–59.7). Concerning the availability of 
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contamination showers or stalls within the hospital facilitates, 33 participants reported 
one to two stalls in their hospital facilities (64.1%, 95% CI, 50.3–76.9). The absence of 
negative-pressure rooms was reported by 16 (31.45%) of the participants, while 15 
(29.4%) reported 1 to 10 negative-pressure rooms. The remaining 12 participants 
reported 11 to 20 negative-pressure rooms. With respect to the number of licensed 
hospital beds in the respondents’ employing facilities, the majority of the participants  
(n = 20) reported the availability of 51 to 150 licensed beds (56.9%, 95% CI, 26.5–53.6). 
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Employee assistance program 
 Yes 
 No 






















































Patients treated during latest episode 
 None 
 ˂ 5 
 5–10 
 ˃ 10 



















Note. The 95% CI indicates the 5% margin of error with the lower and upper confidence 




Concerning the geographic locale of the hospitals employing the respondents, in 
terms of urban versus rural, and disaster preparedness, the majority of the study 
participants reported rural locations (n = 24, 47.1%, 33.5–61.1). Hospitals within 
suburban (25.5%, 95% CI, 15.1–39.6) and urban (27.4%, 95% CI, 16.9–41.7) areas were 
comparable. Regarding the contact numbers of the Tennessee State Health Department 
and the Local County Health Department, there was no difference in the number of 
participants acknowledging number availability; 25 affirmed the availability of the 
contact numbers (49.0%, 95% CI, 35.2–62.9) and 24 participants negated their 
availability (47.1%, 95% CI, 33.5–61.1). 
Construct Validity of Variables 
Tables C1 through C4 within Appendix C present the dependent variable of 
disaster/emergency preparedness with the independent variables of problems, policy, and 
politics, the latter of which are also predictors in the linear modeling. Survey responses 
related to the dependent variable of disaster preparedness and the three main independent 
variables were collected using a response scale of 1 to 10, which was later transformed 
into proportion using the central tendency theorem for variable scale transformation. 
Responses to six survey questions were combined to comprise the dependent-variable 
construct. Similarly, the independent variable, collectively comprised of the related 
problems, policy, and politics, follows a similar transformation and construct. These 
variables were tested for construct validity using the Cronbach’s alpha. 
Table C1 illustrates the number of items comprising the dependent variable, as 
well as the item test correlation; average interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and the 
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alpha (See Appendix D). The test scale, which is the mean (i.e., the standardized item for 
the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance estimated at 0.67, while the 
alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.92, implying a strong correlation. Table C2 
demonstrates the number of items comprising the disaster/emergency problems as the 
collective independent variable, as well as the item test correlation; the average interitem 
correlation (i.e., covariance); and the alpha. The test scale, which is the mean (i.e., the 
standardized item for the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance 
estimated at 0.80, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.95, implying a 
strong or high correlation.  
Table C3 depicts the number of items comprising disaster/emergency policy as 
the collective independent variable, as well as the item test correlation; the average 
interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and the alpha. The test scale, which is the mean 
(i.e., the standardized item for the average interitem correlation) represents the covariance 
estimated at 0.76, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s alpha was 0.93, implying a 
strong correlation. Table C4 indicates the number of items collectively comprising the 
disaster/emergency politics as the independent variable, as well as the item test 
correlation; average interitem correlation (i.e., covariance); and alpha. The test scale, 
which is the mean (i.e., the standardized item for the average interitem correlation) 
represents the covariance estimated at 0.43, while the alpha coefficient or Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.69, implying a moderate correlation. 
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Correlation Between Disaster/Emergency Preparedness, Problems, Policy, and 
Politics 
Table C5 illustrates a correlation matrix for the correlation between emergency 
preparedness and disaster independent or predictor variables.  A direct, positive, and high 
or strong correlation exists between disaster/ emergency preparedness as the dependent 
variable and the independent variable of disaster/emergency-preparedness problems (r = 
0.92, p < .001). Similarly, a direct, positive, and high correlation was observed between 
the dependent variable and the independent variable of disaster/emergency-preparedness 
policy (r = 0.94, p < .001). Additionally, a direct, positive, and high correlation was 
observed between the dependent variable and the independent variable of 
disaster/emergency-preparedness politics (r = 0.88, p < .001; see Appendix D, Table C5). 
Multiple Linear Relationships 
The multiple linear regression model examined simultaneously the three 
predictors or explanatory variables such as the problem, policy, and politics in predicting 
disaster/emergency preparedness. Confounding variables such as age, sex, education and 
geographic location of the healthcare or hospital settings are also shown. Table 5 presents 





Table 5  
Multiple Linear Predictors of Disaster/Emergency Preparedness in Tennessee Hospitals 
Variables β t F(df) SE aR2 99% CI p 
Model 0.22  41.6(1,37)  0.91  ˂ .001 
 
Problems 0.20 1.34  0.15  –0.21–0.60 0.19 
 
Policy 0.41 2.94  0.14  .03–0.79 .01 
 
























































































































Note. Adjusted for categorical variables within the model; namely, education, gender, 
age, and hospital/healthcare system Tennessee location (i.e., urban, rural, or suburban). 
Dashed rows represent no data. β = beta coefficient; t = the predictor value indicative of 
the significance; F = the ratio between the variance; df = number of ways sample can 
vary; SE = standard error; aR2 = adjusted coefficient of determination, implying the 
variation in disaster/emergency preparedness due to the combined effect of the 
continuous and categorical independent variables within the model; CI = confidence 
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interval; p = probability. 
The R2 of 0.91 shows that 91% of the variation in disaster/emergency 
preparedness is explained by the model. The overall multiple linear regression equation 
was then obtained using only the significant variables at p < .05:  
Disaster and emergency preparedness (Y) = -0.22 + 0.26(politics) + 0.41(policy) + 0.46 
(Masters) + 0.11 (Suburban) + E. 
Basically, for 1 unit change or increase in politics, there was a 0.26 change in 
disaster preparedness, while for 1 unit change in policy, there was 0.41 change is disaster 
preparedness in the model while controlling for other significant confounding variables. 
Model Fitness 
The model fitness requires the test for residual besides the regression result such 
as slope coefficient, p-values and R2.  The model fitness requires the assessment of the 
residuals, implying the examination of how poorly the model utilized in the prediction of 
disaster /emergency preparedness by policy and politics represents these data. Basically, 
residuals represent the leftover of the disaster preparedness dependent variable after 
fitting policy and politics and controlling for the potential confounders in the data. 
Therefore, the residual explains or indicates the unexplained pattern in the fitted model. 
This fitness test enables the assessment of the liner regression assumption as well, such as 
normality assumption.   
 Figure 3, illustrates the standardized normality probability plot, implying 
sensitivity to non-normality the lower (tail) and upper end (tail) of the data, indicative of 
normality in the spread of the data.  Figure 4 demonstrates the plots of the quantiles 
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dependent variables and independent variables (politics, policies) against quantiles of a 
normal distribution. Relative to figure 3, the standardized normality probability plot, the 
quantile plot is indicative of a slight deviation from normal at the lower and upper tail of 
the plot. In effect there seems to be a minor and trivial deviation from normality, 
implying that the observed residuals are close to a normal distribution, and hence model 
fitness.  
 
Figure 3. Standardized normal probability plot for residuals on Disaster Preparedness 




Figure 4. Quantile plot of the DV and IVs against the quantiles of normal distribution.  
 
Summary 
The following research questions guided this study: 
1. How do perceptions of resource, training, and budgetary problems relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
2. How do perceptions of federal, state, and hospital policy and plans relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
3. How do perceptions of external and internal organizational politics relate to 
the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of Tennessee? 
These questions were answered using linear regression modeling with analytics 
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performed through STATA statistical software (version 15.0). A significant correlation 
was observed, implying that policy and politics could be used to predict disaster 
/emergency preparedness in the state of Tennessee. The overall findings with the 
independent variables, after accounting for socio-demographics the confounders, indicate 
moderate to strong relationships among two predictor independent variables and the 
dependent variable. Specifically, policy and politics could be used to predict disaster and 
emergency preparedness in the state of Tennessee. The problem IV was not significant. 
The findings are indicative of the opportunity to improve basic disaster/emergency 
preparedness in TN. The results also indicate a gap between an awareness of public 
policy regarding such preparedness and associated expectations. In Chapter 5, the 
interpretation of the findings is expanded and the implications for social change are 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Overview 
The purpose of this research was to examine the gap between effective hospital 
emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of healthcare 
providers. Specifically, I assessed the exposure effect of the problem and related policy 
and politics in disaster preparedness within healthcare systems, including hospital 
settings. 
In this study, I aimed to examine the implications of the perceived disaster 
problem, policy, and politics. A cross-sectional design was used to gather data from 
participants in healthcare settings and hospitals in the state of Tennessee. The questions 
reflected the participants’ sociodemographic, available resources for disaster 
preparedness, as well as the main independent variables, namely problem, policy, and 
politics and the dependent variable, namely disaster and emergency preparedness. 
I compared federal expectations surrounding hospital preparedness to 
expectations drawn from surveys in this study from first line ED caregivers. The analyses 
were based upon a multiple linear regression model. The model indicated that there is a 
significant relationship among politics and policy variables with disaster/emergency 
preparedness. Most importantly, my findings suggest that politics and policies can be 
used to predict disaster preparedness in Tennessee hospitals and the state healthcare 
system. 
In testing the hypotheses of this study, I collected data to determine the gap 
between hospital emergency preparedness and the related awareness and perceptions of 
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healthcare providers. The research questions were answered through responses to the 
Disaster Preparedness: Acute-Care Hospital Survey (Kaji et al., 2008), administered to 
Tennessee ED nurse leaders (i.e., directors or managers; N = 108) as a sample of the ED 
target population. The survey was a 73-question tool that was adapted to fit the particular 
scope of this current research with the permission of the author (see Appendix B). The 
overall sample in this research consisted of 51 participants, which represents a 47.2% 
response rate—an adequate sample based upon sample size and power estimations, as 
well as the common sample-size estimate of 10 to 15 responses per variable (see Field, 
2009). 
The variables used in this study were based upon information gained from the 
literature review. The dependent variable is emergency preparedness, while the 
independent variables were specified as the problems stream, policy stream, and politics 
stream. These variables are described along with the study methodology, reflecting the 
matrix involved in the construct of their roles as independent and response variables. 
These constructs were examined for validity and assessed in correlation with the 
covariance matrix for use in the regression models. The analysis tools, rationale, and 
assumptions are detailed along with the results. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The descriptive assessment of the study demographics characterizes the sample in 
terms of gender, age, education, and geographic locale. A cross-sectional, 
nonexperimental design was applied in the study. The majority of the participants were 
female (72.5%), while the highest frequency by age group were 41 to 50 years of age 
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(29.4%) and 31 to 40 years of age (27.4%). The majority of the participants had earned 
either a Bachelor’s (47.1%) or Master’s (41.2%) degree as their highest educational 
attainment. Although no demographics for ED nurse leaders could be located, a survey 
conducted in 2019 on a sample of emergency, trauma, and transport nurses by 
Schumaker, Taylor, and McGonigle found 78.8% of ED nurses to be female, with an 
average age of 43.6 years. The educational demographic in my study was somewhat 
different, with 60.4% possessing a Bachelor’s and 16.3% a Master’s degree. The 
difference in educational preparation can be explained by the fact that many leadership 
positions in nursing require a master’s degree to qualify, while this sample was staff 
nurses. 
Disaster-preparedness training was also reported, as was drill-practice experience 
and disaster-response involvement. The majority of the respondents (74.5%) affirmed 
participation in a specific form of disaster-preparedness training, while an estimated 
60.8% reported participation in annual practice exercises or drills with multiagency 
participation within their Tennessee healthcare institutions. In addition, an estimated 
58.8% of the participants reported participating in a disaster response. 
Overall, the participant responses to disaster-preparedness training, participation 
in drill or practice exercise, and actual involvement in disaster/emergency events 
illustrated an above-average awareness within the state of Tennessee based upon the 
study sample. However, no data are available from previous assessments of the 
Tennessee healthcare system and hospitals of disaster preparedness to affirm or negate 
the conclusions drawn from the current study survey. Applying Kingdon’s (2003) theory 
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of a small window of opportunity for each policy to move forward, the knowledge 
without effective action to promote preparedness may indicate that the window of 
opportunity was missed and another competing priority surpassed disaster preparedness. 
This lack of existing research presents opportunities for further study to facilitate 
effective policy development and to some extent may also explain the insufficiencies and 
gaps found in the current status of Tennessee hospitals and the overall healthcare system 
with regard to disaster preparedness. 
In this study, I described the Tennessee healthcare system and available hospital 
resources for disaster/emergency response. Regarding in-house radiation safety officers, 
35.3% participants reported such a resource, while 45.1% reported one to two 
decontamination showers or stalls within their facilities. The availability of negative-
pressure isolation rooms within their facilities or institutions was indicated by 31.4% of 
the survey respondents. The resources required for a healthcare system to provide an 
effective disaster/emergency response were found to be below average within the 
institutions of this study sample. Despite the lack of comparable data, the findings in this 
study clearly demonstrate gaps and resources too limited to meet the requirements for 
effective disaster/emergency preparedness. The study results suggest the need for a 
comprehensive statewide, ongoing evaluation of available resources for disaster/ 
emergency response within the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospital settings. 
Developing and maintaining a Tennessee state healthcare emergency and disaster 
surveillance and monitoring system could potentially lead to dramatic improvements. 
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Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 was as follows: How do perceptions of resource, training, 
and budgetary problems relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
Tennessee? Application of a multiple linear regression model showed that the problem 
variable was not significant. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 was as follows: How do perceptions of federal, state, and 
hospital policy and plans relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
Tennessee? Specifically, for a unit change or increase in perceived politics, a 0.54 
increase in disaster/emergency preparedness within the Tennessee healthcare setting, 
including hospitals, must be evident. Practically, the more often disaster/emergency 
policy is perceived and reported, the better prepared the healthcare system, including 
hospitals, is in addressing hospital emergencies and disasters. A correlation between 
policy and emergency/disaster preparedness was observed, implying a direct correlation. 
The perceived polices on disaster preparedness enhances the preparedness of the 
healthcare institutions in addressing emergency and disaster. Specifically, based on the 
regression equation, policy could be used to predict disaster or emergency preparedness, 
implying that for 1 unit increase in policy, there was a 0.41 increase in disaster and 
emergency preparedness perception units in the state of Tennessee healthcare system. 
The more likely the disaster/emergency policy is perceived or known to be in place, the 
better prepared the healthcare system, including hospitals, is in addressing hospital 
emergencies and disasters. This finding is supported by previous literature (see Cliff et 
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al., 2009), implying a direct correlation between perceived or known policy related to 
disaster/emergency response and related preparedness. The findings are indicative of the 
need to develop, implement, and evaluate policy on disaster/emergency preparedness 
within the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, for enhanced preparedness 
and capabilities to effectively respond to disasters and emergencies. 
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 was as follows: How do perceptions of external and internal 
organizational politics relate to the emergency preparedness of EDs across the state of 
Tennessee? With a 1-unit change or increase in perceived politics, a 0.26 increase in 
disaster/emergency preparedness perception units is indicated within the Tennessee 
healthcare system, including hospitals. This finding corresponds with Kingdon’s (2011) 
theory of politics because sudden and catastrophic acts of terrorism, mega storms, and 
pandemics require, among other things, the heightened skills, equipment, and education 
that will meet the needs of supporting organizations. These occurrences are random and 
infrequent, and continuous preparedness is costly and labor intensive. Consequently, all 
facets of the driving forces must be considered to increase understanding surrounding 
organizational behavior as it relates to emergency preparedness. Practically, the more 
often disaster/emergency politics are perceived and reported, the better prepared the 
healthcare system, including hospitals, is in addressing hospital emergencies and 
disasters. This finding is supported by previous literature (see Cliff et al., 2009), implying 
a direct correlation between perceived politics related to disaster/emergency response and 
related preparedness. The findings are suggestive of the need to examine the implication 
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of politics in disaster/emergency preparedness and within the Tennessee healthcare 
system, including hospitals, for enhanced preparedness and the capabilities necessary for 
effective disaster/emergency response. 
There were three independent or predictor variables used to address hospital 
emergency and disaster preparedness, namely problem, policy and politics, implying the 
prediction of emergency and disaster preparedness as dependent or response variable, 
given these predictor variables. This model showed a significant correlation of these 
predictors separately in a simple linear model, but in the multiple linear model, the 
problem was not significant. However, although insignificant, there was a prediction of 
emergency and disaster preparedness, given a perceived emergency and disaster 
preparedness problem in this sample. Specifically, the problem related to emergency and 
disaster preparedness could not be significantly used in this sample to predict emergency 
and disaster preparedness. Because random error quantification is used in hypothesis 
testing, it is possible that the observed insignificant prediction of hospital emergency and 
disaster preparedness may be due to the marginalized sample size in the multiple linear 
regression mode as a result of multiple comparison. Absence of evidence does not always 
imply evidence of absence.  
Because a single variable such as policy, which is significant in predicting 
hospital emergency and disaster preparedness in this multiple linear modeling, does not 
completely explain the observed the correlation, categorical variables such as education 
and urbanity had a role as explanatory model. Education and/or the geographic locale of 
the hospital setting as urbanity influenced the predictive effect of policy and politics as 
137 
 
multiple predictors in hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. This multivariable 
or multiple regression model is indicative of the significance of a Master’s degree and 
suburban location of the healthcare system in the combined predictive effect of policy 
and politics on hospital emergency and disaster preparedness. Specifically, the perception 
of healthcare or health system emergency and disaster preparedness is influenced in this 
sample by graduate education, namely a Master’s degree and the suburban location of the 
hospital or healthcare system.  
Limitations 
Despite the strength of this research in identifying the needs of, and resources in, 
hospitals and healthcare systems toward addressing disaster preparedness, limitations 
exist. First, as a cross-sectional design, the findings and their applications may be 
influenced by unmeasurable and residual confounding factors. However, it is highly 
unlikely that the correlation between the dependent variable (i.e., disaster preparedness); 
the independent variables (i.e., the problems, policy, and politics); and the predictability 
of disaster preparedness by these variables is driven solely by these applications and 
confounding factors. Regardless of how sophisticated a statistical software is to control 
for confounding factors, residual factors persist (Holmes, 2009). Additionally, the 
multivariable modeling in this study might be underpowered, given the requirement to 
increase the sample size during the multiple-comparison phase of model specification and 
analysis to avoid a Type I error rejecting a true null hypothesis. In effect the observed 
inability of disaster and emergency related problem in predicting disaster preparedness 
may be explained in part by the limited statistical power of the study. 
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Implications and Social Change 
The findings of this study contribute to social change by increasing understanding 
of the actual state of preparedness perceived by ED nurse leaders within the state of 
Tennessee. Identified gaps in this study namely policy and politics cause a shortfall when 
preparedness is compared with expectations. The community at large expects that the 
local hospital can manage any medical emergency and has no reason to believe otherwise 
until actually faced with a disaster and systems are tested. Disaster preparedness is a 
timely and relevant concern due to ongoing and, in some cases, unmitigable risk. Disaster 
preparedness is innovative and interdisciplinary. Risks are variable and can have distinct 
differences based upon many factors such as region, industry, and population density. 
Implications to social change also include heightened awareness of policy 
requirements, coupled with a standardized framework of inter-operational response 
principles in a state of constant readiness. The quality and effectiveness of response in a 
disaster situation can reduce the negative impact on communities and lives. A 
standardized approach that holds to the tenets of all-hazards preparedness will leave no 
question as to the capabilities of each hospital. 
In this study, I identified the wide variation in levels of disaster/emergency 
preparedness among the hospitals that participated in the research. Not only in the 
perception of preparedness, but also in the actual availability of resources, the provision 
of training, and the availability and content of policy. There are opportunities for creating 
social change by improving the overall awareness of federal, state, and hospital policy, as 
well as the associated expectations for hospital disaster preparedness. Similarly, with the 
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enhancement of such awareness, perceptions of disaster preparedness can be influenced 
in a positive manner. 
With the knowledge gained from this study, recommendations can be made to 
develop standards of preparation that will “bridge” the described gaps; create greater and 
more accurate awareness; and support the development of standardized, comprehensive 
emergency-preparedness systems. The ideal system will be better prepared to handle all 
hazards and large-scale events. This research will serve as a tool in support of the 
development of public policy that will enable an effective and sustainable system of 
preparedness. 
Future Research 
In this study, I examined training, resources, experience, and drill and practice 
exercise, as they relate to disaster preparedness as an exploratory or descriptive 
component. The response from the statistically powered sample, although generalizable 
to the targeted population, indicates a need for further studies to include statewide 
hospitals in rural, urban, and suburban areas. Additionally, given restricted resources for 
disaster/emergency preparedness, annual assessment of hospital capabilities in addressing 
such preparedness is required.  
Considerations for further study include the following aspects of the surveillance 
and monitoring of hospital-emergency and disaster preparedness and response:  
1. Number and level of trained radiation-safety staff within hospitals, monitored 




2. Incidence and cumulative incidence of nosocomial infections and available 
clinical guidelines in management and prevention including care-provider 
handwashing. 
3. The perceptions of chief executive officers and the board of directors 
surrounding the need for capacity development in hospitals and healthcare-
system disaster/emergency preparedness. 
4. Assessment of disaster/emergency preparedness, implementation, and 
evaluation. 
Overall, the current study is suggestive of a rigorous and continuous assessment 
of training, education, and resources addressing hospital-emergency and disaster 
preparedness. With such studies guiding future research, insufficiencies will be 
addressed, and gaps will be narrowed within the state of Tennessee, thus improving 
hospital disaster preparedness via published recommendations and updated requirements 
meeting the national standard of care. 
Recommendations 
The findings of this study emerged through analysis of existing knowledge and 
perceptions of the problems, policy, and politics associated with hospital-emergency and 
disaster preparedness on the pathway toward enhancing disaster preparedness and 
response within the Tennessee healthcare system including hospitals. These facilities are 
underequipped when it comes to resources such as decontamination showers, negative-
pressure isolation rooms, and radiation-safety officers, especially within rural areas. 
Consistent with the Kingdon’s (2003) theory of a window of opportunity to create 
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interest in needed policy, the information gained from this research can be used as a 
catalyst in creating awareness of the need for policy development. 
The Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, is also limited with respect 
to specific emergency training programs, mandatory disaster-preparedness education 
requirements, quarterly multiagency drill or practice-exercise exposure, and the 
state/local health-department contact and communication process. These observations 
and the identified insufficiencies in disaster/emergency preparedness, as reported by the 
study sample, are suggestive of an immediate need to establish a state of Tennessee 
healthcare-system disaster/emergency-preparedness surveillance and monitoring system. 
The overarching objective behind this study was to assess the impact or effect on 
the Tennessee healthcare system, including hospitals, of problems, policy, and politics 
related to disaster/emergency preparedness and response. Due to the sample size and 
characteristics, further study is needed with (a) a larger sample stratified or blocked 
according to geographic population size, comparing urban, suburban, and rural locales, as 
well as the number of hospitals within these geographical areas; (b) hospital executive 
directors and boards of directors; and (c) needs assessments from the state department of 
health and the local health department on disaster/emergency training for Tennessee 
healthcare systems including hospitals. First, since the current study size is not large 
enough as initially anticipated, increasing the sample size will result in increase in the 
power of the study as well as reliable generalizability. Secondly, the inclusion of a 
hospital executive will allow for subpopulation analysis and a more reliable findings in 
terms of reliability. Thirdly, in order for TN to implement policy in disaster emergency 
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preparedness, the inclusion of the state health department in the survey allows for a more 
reliable inference for policy change in disaster preparedness. The availability of reliable 
and accurate data will result in intervention mapping conducive to consistent gap 
narrowing in the knowledge, skills, and resources required for surveillance and 
monitoring of hospital-emergency and disaster preparedness and response. 
Conclusions 
Self-report surveys can introduce information, selection, and misclassification 
biases into the correlation between disaster preparedness and independent variables such 
as the problems, policy, and politics associated with disasters/emergencies involving the 
healthcare system including hospitals. Self-reported responses have a tendency to 
introduce an estimated 20% observation bias within collected data (Smith & Noble, 
2014). However, it is highly unlikely that the nexus between the response or dependent 
variable and the independent or predictor variables in this study is driven solely by such 
bias. This implies the accuracy and internal and external validity in the application of 
these findings to healthcare systems including hospitals for the development of disaster-
preparedness policy and guidelines and their implementation and evaluation. While 
confounding factors are not bias, they result in a bias estimate between the independent 
variable; the predictor or explanatory variables (i.e., the problems, policy, and politics); 
and the dependent, response, or outcome variable (i.e., disaster preparedness). 
Notwithstanding this potential in data modeling, it is unlikely that the observed point 
estimates in the correlation and the linear regression applied in this study are driven 
solely by these unmeasured confounding factors inherent to the survey data. 
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In summary, the disaster preparedness of the Tennessee healthcare system, 
including hospitals, directly correlates with the problems, policy, and politics associated 
with disaster/emergency preparedness. Significantly, policy, and politics related to the 
disaster/emergency preparedness of the healthcare system, including hospitals, are 
predictive of disaster response after controlling for potentially confounding factors. These 
findings are suggestive of the need for the state of Tennessee to address the issues 
impacting hospital disaster preparedness in an effective manner through the creation of a 
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Appendix A: Study Survey 
 
 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS: ACUTE-CARE HOSPITAL SURVEY 
BY: Kathleen Hirsch, RN, MSN, MBA 
 
Length of time as an emergency-department (ED) nurse manager: ____________ 
 
Please circle the most accurate response: 
 
1. Gender 
  A. Male 
  B. Female 
 
2. Age 
  A. 21–30 
  B. 31–40  
  C. 41–50 
  D. 51–60 
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  E. 61–70 
 
3. Academic Degree 
  A. Associate 
  B. Bachelor’s Degree 
  C. Master’s Degree 
  D. Doctorate 
 
4. Have you had any specific training in emergency preparedness? 
  A. Yes 
  B. No 
 
5. Do you know of any public policy that dictates the emergency preparedness of your 
  institution? 
  A. Yes 




Please circle the most accurate response: 
 
6. What is the number of licensed beds within your hospital?  
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   A. ˂ 50 
   B. 51–150 
   C. 150–299 
   D. 300+ 
 
7. How would you describe the area where your hospital is located? 
   A. Rural (i.e., outside a suburban area with a generally a low population) 
   B. Suburban (i.e., adjacent to or surrounding the center of an urban area) 
   C. Urban (i.e., the center of an incorporated community or municipality with a  
     population of 2,500 or greater) 
 
8. How many miles travel is it to the nearest hospital?  
  A. 0–10 
  B. 11–25 
  C. 26–50 
  D. 50+ 
 
9. When was the last time the disaster plan of your institution was updated or revised? 
  A. Within the last 2 years 
  B. More than 2 years ago 
  C. Never 
  D. Do not know 
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10. Is the contact number for the Tennessee Department of Health and the local County  
 Department of Health posted in a readily accessible location within the emergency  
 department? 
  A. Yes 
  B. No 
  C. Don’t know 
 
11. What methods are available during a disaster for staff to communicate with other  
 departments internally and also outside the facility? 
 A. Pager 
  B. Cell phone 
  C. Walkie-talkie 
  D. Intercom 
  E. High band/Low band/EMS radio 
  F. HAM radio 
  G. Other:   
 
12. How would you rate the capability of staff trained in the decontamination process?  
 A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
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  E. Very good 
 
13.  How would you rate the level of personal protective equipment  
  available within your institution, with self-contained breathing apparatus and  
  a fully encapsulated chemical-protection suit as the highest rating, and mask, gown,  
  gloves, and shoe covers as the lowest rating?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
14.  How many decontamination showers or stalls are available within your facility?  
  A. 1–2 
  B. 3–6 
  C. 7+ 
  D. None 
  E. Don’t know 
 
15.  Does your institution employ an in-house, radiation-safety officer who would be  
  available during a radiological event? 
  A. Yes 
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  B. No 
  C. Don’t know 
 
16.  How many days of generic (i.e., nonpharmaceutical) supplies are maintained on  
  your site? 
  A. Less than 3 
  B. 3+ 
  C. Don’t know 
 
17.  How often does your hospital have a drill or practice disaster exercise with  
  multiagency participation (e.g., with emergency medical services, fire and rescue,  
  hazmat team, law enforcement, Department of Health, and/or other hospitals)? 
  A. Quarterly or more frequently 
  B. Annually 
  C. Every other year 
  D. Never 
 
18.  When a disaster drill is conducted, how would you rate the critique or grade of the  
  drill by external observers? 
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
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  D. Good 
  E. Very Good 
 
19.  How would you rate the formal mechanism or policy to “trigger” activation of the  
  disaster plan of your institution?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
20.  Which of the following constitutes the primary reason for ED overcrowding within  
  your institution? 
  A. Increased ED patient volume 
  B. Lack of sufficient inpatient beds 
  C. Lack of nursing staff 
  D. Lack of primary-care services 
  E. Other 
  F. Don’t know 
 
21.  Does your institution have a plan in place for mass fatalities?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
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  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
22.  How many negative-pressure isolation beds do you have within your institution?  
  A. 1–2 
  B. 3–5 
  C. 6–10 
  D. 11–15 





23.  Does your organization have a designated media-relations officer who can act as  
  a single point of information release in case of a disaster?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
24.  Are there engineers available within your institution to assess whether your facility  
  is safe for occupation in the event of a disaster? 
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
25.  In case of a disaster, does your institution have a “lock-down” policy in place,  
  mandating that all entrances and exits are secured?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
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  E. Strongly agree 
 
26.  Are there are any government requirements that direct hospital disaster  
  preparedness?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
27.  Does your institution offer an Employee Assistance Program or other programs to  
  treat posttraumatic stress and provide grief counselling to employees? 
  A. Yes 
  B. No 
  C. Don’t know 
 
28.  Does your institution require mandatory education on disaster preparedness? 
  A. Yes 
  B. No 





29.  How would you rate the disaster plan of your institution?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
30.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to utilize the Hospital Emergency  
  Incident Command System?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
31.  How would you rate the emergency-staff call-back plan of your institution?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 




32.  How would you rate collaboration between your institution and the city or  
  community disaster/emergency committee?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
33.  How would you rate the special agreement or process your institution has in place  
  with vendors to obtain medical supplies during a disaster?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
34. How would you rate the chemical-spill or decontamination team of your institution?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
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35.  How would you rate the plans and procedures your institution has in place for the 
   evacuation of patients and personnel in case of a disaster?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
36.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to isolate or segregate  
  decontamination services from other patient areas?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
37.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to treat multiple patients exposed  
  to a nerve agent, with consideration to the amount of atropine, pralidoxime, or  
  duodote available?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
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  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
38.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to treat multiple patients with  
  cyanide exposure, with consideration to the number of cyanide kits the hospital has  
  available?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
39. How would you rate the ability of your institution to assess radiological  
  contamination with a Geiger counter or other means?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 





40.  How would you rate the level of disaster-preparedness training of residents,  
  hospitalists, and/or house officers within your institution?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
41.  How would you rate the level of training received by the ED staff of your institution  
  on biological weapons?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
42.  How would you rate the stockpile of antibiotics maintained by your institution for  
  disaster use?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
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  E. Very good 
 
43.  How would you rate the stockpile of pharmaceuticals set aside within your  
  institution to treat staff and families during a disaster? 
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
44.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to track fluctuations in the patient  
  census, patient complaints, and diagnoses (i.e., surveillance)?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 





45.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to increase capacity during a  
  disaster (i.e., number of staffed beds in excess of routine operating capacity that  
  could be opened to increase disaster capacity)?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
46.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to reallocate or increase resources  
  during a disaster (e.g., cancel elective procedures or discharge inpatients early) to  
  make additional rooms available for inpatient use?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
47.  How well do you think your institution is prepared to provide support to staff and  
  healthcare providers in the event of a large-scale disaster?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
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  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
48.  How would you rate the ability of your institution to identify and manage victims of  
  bioterrorism?  
  A. Very poor 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neutral 
  D. Good 
  E. Very good 
 
49.  What level of risk do you perceive exists for your acute-care hospital if faced with a  
  future disaster incident?  
  A. Very low 
  B. Poor 
  C. Neither low nor high 
  D. High 





50.  Are changes in the disaster policy of your institution driven by major events  
  across the country?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
51.  Do you feel your institution is adequately equipped to function during a disaster  
  emergency involving a radiologic attack?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
52.  Is your institution adequately equipped to function during a disaster emergency  
  involving a nuclear attack?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
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  E. Strongly agree 
 
53.  Do you feel your institution is adequately equipped to function during a disaster  
  emergency involving a biological-weapons attack?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree or disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
54.  Is your institution adequately equipped to function during a disaster emergency  
  involving a chemical-weapons attack?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree or disagree 
  D. Agree 





55.  Is your organization adequately equipped to function during an emergency  
  involving a natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, tornado, flood, or earthquake)?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
56.  Are you and other staff within your institution adequately trained to deal with  
  disaster outbreaks in your acute-care hospital?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
57.  Since 9/11, is your institution more prepared for a disaster incident?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 




58.  As a healthcare worker, do you have confidence that your institution will protect  
  you during a disaster?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
59. As a healthcare worker, do you view your community or institution as at risk for a  
  disaster incident?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 





60.  Does your institution have adequate programs and policies in place to respond to a  
  large-scale disaster?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
61.  Do you view the risk of a disaster incident as serious and with the propensity to  
  adversely impact staff and patients? 
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
62.  As an ED manager or hospital executive, do you understand the responsibilities of  
  the hospital management team regarding disaster preparedness?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
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  E. Strongly agree 
 
63.  Overall, do you view your institution as having strong disaster-preparedness policy  
  in place and performing well in this area?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
64.  Overall, do you view your institution as equipped and prepared to respond to a  
  disaster in general (e.g., bioterrorism or natural, chemical, radiographic, or  
  nuclear)?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 





65.  Overall, do you view your institution as prepared to provide support to staff and  
  other healthcare providers during a large-scale disaster?  
  A. Strongly disagree 
  B. Disagree 
  C. Neither agree nor disagree 
  D. Agree 
  E. Strongly agree 
 
66.  When your hospital is experiencing a shortage in nurse staffing within the ED, how  
  often do you close some areas of the ED to maintain a nurse-patient ratio of 1:4?  
  A. Never 
  B. Rarely 
  C. Sometimes 
  D. Often 
  E. Always 
 
67.  How many times per month does your hospital reach 100% operational capacity?  
  A. Never 
  B. Rarely 
  C. Sometimes 
  D. Often 




68.  How often does your hospital divert ambulance traffic to other facilities?  
  A. Never 
  B. Rarely 
  C. Sometimes 
  D. Often 
  E. Always 
 
69.  Does your hospital use agency nurses to expand nursing staff when necessary?  
  A. Never 
  B. Rarely 
  C. Sometimes  
  D. Often 
  E. Always 
 
70.  When was the last time a disaster plan was initiated at your institution? 
  A. Within the last 2 years 
  B. More than 2 years ago 





71.  Have you ever participated in a disaster response? 
  A. Yes 
  B. No 
  C. Don’t know 
 
72.  How many disaster responses have you participated in while working at your  
  current healthcare facility? 
  A. One 
  B. Two 
  C. More than two? 
  D. Don’t know 
  E. None 
  
73.  How many patients were treated during the largest disaster episode in which you  
  participated? 
  A. None 
  B. < 5 
  C .  5–10 
  D. > 10 





Appendix B: Survey Permission 
January 17, 2012 
Dear Dr. Kaji, 
I communicated with you previously regarding the Disaster Preparedness Survey you 
developed. I am a Ph.D. student at Walden University, majoring in public policy. I am 
also the Vice President and Chief Nursing Officer of a large metropolitan hospital within 
Nashville, Tennessee. 
I plan to conduct a study for my doctoral program on hospital emergency preparedness, 
related policy expectations, and care-provider perceptions of readiness. Emergency-
department nurse managers will be sampled from all acute-care hospitals across the state 
of Tennessee. I have conducted an extensive literature review that included your work. 
Additionally, I have reviewed several survey tools and found your instrument best suited 
to the needs and purpose of my study. It has the appropriate foundation and a range that 
covers the topic without undue complexity. 
I would like to ask for your permission to use the Disaster Preparedness Survey in my 
study. Modification would involve a few added questions regarding perception and policy 
expectations, as well as changes to any questions specific to the South Bay Area. I look 
forward to your response and welcome any questions you may have regarding my 
proposed study. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Kathleen Hirsch  







Appendix C: Constructs and Correlation Matrix 
Constructs 
Table C1  












18 50 0.66 0.77 0.94 
19 51 0.95 0.62 0.89 
21 49 0.88 0.65 0.90 
30 51 0.86 0.66 0.91 
34 50 0.87 0.66 0.91 
56 51 0.88 0.65 0.90 
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation 
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.67), while 0.92 is the alpha 



















45 51 0.87 0.84 0.95 
51 50 0.90 0.81 0.95 
56 50 0.95 0.77 0.93 
63 50 0.92 0.80 0.94 
64 51 0.95 0.78 0.93 
Note. The test scale is the mean or the standardized item. The average interitem 
correlation denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.80), while 0.95 is 
the alpha coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of the 
problems as the independent variable within the linear regression model. 
 
Table C3  
 













19 51 0.90 0.77 0.91 
26 51 0.86 0.81 0.93 
60 51 0.93 0.73 0.90 
63 51 0.93 0.73 0.89 
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation 
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.76), while 0.93 is the alpha 
coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of policy as the 
independent variable within the linear regression model. 
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Table C4  
 












23 50 0.88 0.19 0.32 
50 51 0.63 0.89 0.89 
63 50 0.85 0.28 0.44 
Note. The test scale is the mean or standardized item. The average interitem correlation 
denotes the additive scale and represents the covariance (0.43), while 0.69 is the alpha 
coefficient for the test scale based upon all variables within the construct of politics as the 
independent variable within the linear regression model. 
Correlation Matrix 
Table C5  
 





DP Policy DP Problems DP Politics 






0.94 (˂ .001) 
 
0.92 (˂ .001) 
 
0.88 (˂ .001) 
 
DP Policy 0.94 (˂ .001) 1.00 0.94 (˂ .001) 0.85 (˂ .001) 
 
DP Problems 0.92 (˂ .001) 0.94 (˂ .001) 1.00 0.89 (˂ .001) 
 
DP Politics 0.88 (˂ .001) 0.85 (˂ .001) 0.89 (˂ .001) 1.00 
Note. The correlation coefficient was adjusted for multiple comparison using the 
Bonferroni correction for Type I error inflation of the adjustment model. DP = 
disaster/emergency preparedness, r = Pearson correlation coefficient; p = type I 
error tolerance as probability value was set at .05. 
